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In early 1914 John Henry Wigmore, dean of the Northwestern University
Law School, was invited to join the American Academy of Jurisprudence,
founded by a group of elite lawyers to reform the law by settling the "small"
number of doctrinal issues left confused and uncertain by conflicting judicial
opinions.' Wigmore responded with a long circular to the charter members
attacking the project. In part, Wigmore opposed the Academy because he wanted
to reserve "the scientific statement of the law" for that "specialist in legal
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science," the full-time law professor.2 He also objected to the Academy's
mission. "The present decade (or even generation) is precisely the time when
a formal statement of the law is inappropriate," Wigrnore wrote. "The law is
so obviously in a seething change that one might as well expect to analyze a
chemical reaction while the test tube is over the flame." 3 "Take any branch
of law you like," Wigmore continued. Torts? "The old-time doctrines of liability
are changing so fast that it is difficult to keep up with them." Criminal Law?
"All along the line a radical re-casting is going on." Evidence? "Nobody knows
how many rules are on the point of crumbling away in the next twenty years."
Constitutional law? "A prophet would be needed to tell us what its complexion
will be as soon as the present unrest has subsided; certainly many existing books
may be sold for old paper."4
Wignore stood at the midpoint of the ninety years chronicled by Morton
Horwitz in his new book, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960:
The Crisis of the Legal Orthodoxy ("Crisis").5 Many American historians,
looking no further than great constitutional cases, have treated the early twentieth
century as a relatively static period in American legal thought, a long dark age
in which most jurists embraced outdated notions of natural rights and Lockean
political philosophy. Often the whole period passes under the label "the Lochner
era," in honor of the 1905 decision of the United States Supreme Court that
most notably defended "liberty of contract" from the intrusions of social
legislation.6 In contrast, Horwitz -ranges across American law and discovers
sweeping change in legal doctrine, legal thought, and social vision. He has
produced the most intellectually ambitious, closely argued, comprehensive, and
engaging study of American legal history from Reconstruction through the New
Deal that has yet appeared.
Horwitz' grand theme is the inherently political nature of law. Following
Duncan Kennedy and his "history-of-doctrinal-contradictions-and-their-mediation
school,"7 Horwitz views American legal history in terms of the rise and fall of
dominant structures of legal thought. He begins with late-Victorian jurists and
their system of abstract, general principles, "Classical Legal Thought." Classical
legal theorists claimed they could deduce from fundamental legal principles
certain outcomes in concrete cases. In fact, classical legal thought was rife with
2. Letter from John Henry Wigmore to William Howard Taft, supra note 1; see John Henry Schlegel,
Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal Realists: The Professionalization of the American
Law Professor, 35 J. LEGAL EDUc. 311, 315 (1985).
3. Letter from John Henry Wigmore to William Howard Taft, supra note 1.
4. Id; see WILLIAM R. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE: SCHOLAR AND REFORMER 226 (1977). See
generally N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law
Institute, LAW & HIST. REV. 55, 57 (1990).
5. MORToN J. HORWrz THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY (1992) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
6. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7. See Robert W. Gordon, An Exchange on Critical Legal Studies betweenRobert W. Gordon and William
Nelson, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 142 (1988). See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
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internal contradictions, which the great industrial and social changes of fin de
sicle America made increasingly apparent. In studies of contracts, torts,
corporate law, property, and the figure of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Horwitz
charts the growing perception of contradictions within classical legal thought,
the collapse of the structure, and the evolution of law in the following generation
to a consequentialist, policy-oriented alternative, "Progressive Legal Thought."
Some members of the new generation of legal thinkers attempted to
reconstruct a neutral rule of law on the basis of social science. Others-in
particular the "critical realists" who are Horwitz' heroes-rejected this new form
of legal positivism and insisted that law was inescapably moral and political.
The work of "critical realists" would be revived by the Critical Legal Studies
(CLS) movement after 1960,8 but it had little influence in the intervening years,
to judge from Crisis' overview of post-realist legal thought. Instead, the social
scientific strand of legal realists, working to expand and legitimate the bureau-
cratic structures of the New Deal, was opposed by "legalist" critics of the
regulatory state. Particularly in the 1950's, doubts about the ability of experts
to produce "scientific, neutral, and apolitical solutions to social and legal
questions" led to the reemergence of a full-blown proceduralist approach to law
in the so-called legal process school. Once again, legal thinkers refused to
acknowledge the political nature of law, this time by envisioning law as a
content-neutral set of procedural rules and guarantees.
Horwitz ends his book just as his generation of legal radicals appear on the
scene. As a result, the reader will have to look elsewhere to understand Horwitz'
own encounters with the mainstream of legal thought. In Part I of this Review
Essay I try to complete the story by placing Crisis in the context of the two
great traditions of twentieth-century American historiography which Horwitz
encountered as a graduate student at Harvard University in the early 1960's.
I briefly describe legal process theory in law and history, which Horwitz
confronted at the Harvard Law School later in the decade and which he attacked
in his award-winning first book, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-
1860 ("Transformation"), published in 1977.9 The founding of the CLS
movement in that year provided the most important context for Horwitz'
subsequent work. Horwitz' general embrace of structuralism, especially as
employed in the early work of the CLS scholar Duncan Kennedy, accounts for
Crisis' trenchant reading of formal law writing on a variety of doctrinal subjects.
It also accounts for the book's most significant shortcoming, an overly schematic
view of legal thought and legal change.
In Part II, I turn to Crisis itself, which I evaluate by, focusing on three topics:
(1) classical legal thought and its demise; (2) the jurisprudence of Oliver Wendell
8. Pp. 270-71.
9. MORTON J. HORW1-Z, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977) [hereinafter
HoRWiTZ, TRANSFORMATION].
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Holmes, Jr.; and (3) legal realism and the "turn" to social science. Horwitz'
identification of an anti-corporation, "old conservatism" among the Gilded Age
judges is a welcome addition to a literature that still commonly depicts the late-
Victorian bench as the willing instrument of corporate wealth. Rather than
develop this revisionist insight into an imaginative reconstruction of the diverse
mental universe of late-Victorian judges, Horwitz reverts to a schematic and
consensual interpretation of their jurisprudence. His chapter on Holmes shows
how historical jurisprudence helped elite jurists navigate between potentially
subversive claims of natural right and potentially redistributive acts of
unconstrained legislatures-a brilliant point. It also inflates a minor shift in
Holmes' theory of torts in the 1890's into a full-blown jurisprudential crisis
based on an unconvincing reading of Holmes' most familiar writings. Finally,
Horwitz joins Natalie E. H. Hull in rescuing the law professors of the progressive
era from the condescension of the legal realists and their heirs,10 and he insists
that the two groups be understood as active participants in the same, broad
reform movement. Yet he never systematically discusses his legal academics'
stand on the political questions of their day, and he ultimately imposes a
dichotomous framework on the realists that obscures the conundrums they faced.
One would never suspect from Crisis that many enthusiasts of the new critical
legal methods-like Wigmore-insisted on the regulation of organized labor
and fiercely denounced dissenters during World War I."
In short, Horwitz has written a maddening book, much like his first. Fifteen
years after Transformation was published, some legal scholars and historians
still compulsively frame their research to refute Horwitz' claims.12 Some critics
have gone beyond disagreement over fact and interpretation to charge that
Horwitz was so blinded by his radical political convictions that he was incapable
of producing trustworthy historical work. These critics did not bother to
investigate, articulate and engage Horwitz' particular vision of historical utility,
and they wrote as if their own understanding of the uses of history was
incontrovertible and value-free.
Although Crisis, too, provides readers of many methodological persuasions
with ample grounds for sharp dissent, it would be a shame if the appearance
of the book set off another round of "Morty-bashing." I, for one, have no desire
to pillory Horwitz for harboring biases or lacking "objectivity," as if any
historian could reproduce the past wie es eigentlich gewesen ist. Yet once one
10. Hull, supra note 4.
11. On Wigmore, see ROAFUE, supra note 4, at 226; Stephen Botein, John Henry Wigmore, in
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 821-22 (3d Supp. 1973); John Henry Wigmore, A New Field for
Systematic Justice, 10 ILL L. REV. 592 (1916).
12. Much of this literature is reviewed in Wythe Holt, Morton Horwitz and the Transformation of
American Legal History, 23 WM. & MARY L REV. 663 (1982). Later examples include Peter Karsten,
Explaining the Fight over the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine: A Kinder Gentler Instrumentalism in the "Age
of Formalism," 10 LAw & HIsT. REV. 45 (1992); Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort
Law, 36 UCLA L REV. 641 (1989).
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puts away "that noble dream," historiographic criticism can still be meaningful
to the extent the critic applies standards that have gained significant support
among professional historians.13 Judged against those standards, Crisis some-
times comes up short, but it also goes a long way toward effecting a major
revision of American legal history, one which finally uncouples the history of
legal thought from political history and joins, it to broad developments in
American intellectual life. Any historian who would complete this project and
finally comprehend the revolutionary change apparent even to Wigmore, an
outspoken opponent of radicalism in the midst of the Lochner era, will owe
Horwitz an enormous debt.
I. CRISIS IN CONTEXT
One of the most important measures of a historian is the relative importance
she attributes to conflict or consensus in the society she studies. By the time
Horwitz commenced his graduate education at Harvard in the early 1960's, the
poles of the "conflict-consensus" continuum had been clearly marked out by
two great historical traditions: the "progressive history" of the interwar period,
most closely identified with Charles A. Beard (1874-1948), Carl L. Becker
(1873-1945), and Vernon Parrington (1871-1929), and the "consensus history"
of the 1940's and 1950's, whose most prominent practitioners were Daniel
Boorstin (b. 1914), Richard Hofstadter (1916-1970), and Louis Hartz (1919-
1986).
Each tradition has interpreted the judiciary of the Lochner era in light of
an overarching thesis of social conflict or social consensus. The progressive
historians, as their name implies, were contemporaries of the war over the
Lochner Court. They shared Wigmore's belief that the liberty-of-contract cases
had produced a remarkable degree of social unrest, and they easily assimilated
these decisions into their interpretation of American history as a great struggle
between the people and the interests.' 4 In The Rise of American Civilization
(1927), for example, Charles A. and Mary R. Beard treated the judiciary's war
on progressive legislation as an incident in the "long and varied campaign to
force noblesse oblige upon the third estate." Though the judges "confessed to
no emotional bias," acted "with sober mien," and spoke "with tongues of logic,"
their "personal dislike for reformers and all their works" and their economic
interests ultimately explained their decisions.'5 This attack on the judiciary
continued the debunking of constitutional law that Charles Beard inaugurated
with his muckraking expose of the Federal Convention, Economic Interpretation
13. See generally PETER A. NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988).
14. For a discussion of the concept of "interests" in progressive thought, see DANIEL RODGERS,
CONTESTED TRUTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLrrTCS SINCE INDEPENDENCE 176-211 (1987)..
15. 2 CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 587 (1927).
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of the Constitution (1913), which revealed that America had never known a true
"government of the people." 6 As Horwitz writes, Beard's book implied "that
the Constitution itself was conceived in earthly sin, the sin of self-interest and
bitter group struggle."17
The progressiv6 historians remained enormously influential until 1940."
But with the outbreak of the Second World War and the nation's confrontation
with Nazism and Stalinism, the mainstream of American history shifted away
from the progressives. If the progressives had stressed political conflict, the
consensus-school historians of the late 1940's and 1950's thought that "the
common climate of American opinion" was more important. 9 Some historians,
like Daniel Boorstin, running hard from his 1930's enthusiasm for radical
politics, celebrated what he perceived as the enduring American consensus.2"
The most compelling interpretation of American history as "a colossal liberal
absolutism," however, was produced by a dissenter, Louis Hartz. His Liberal
Tradition in America (1955)21 was (in Daniel Rodgers' words) "a brilliant,
scorchingly critical portrait of a political culture without exits, without critics,
imprisoned in one dimensionality."22
America, in Hartz' telling, was a "'petit-bourgeois' giant" whose
"Lockianism was absolute and irrational." The Supreme Court was not the
bulwark of the wealthy but "the Hebraic expositor of the American general will,
building on the irrational acceptance of Locke the Talmudic rationality involved
in [its] application to specific cases." 24 The maximum-hour law struck down
in Lochner was not done in by the machinations of Big Business. Its fatal flaw
was its premise: the existence of permanent classes of workers and employers,
monstrosities in the Horatio Alger world of the jurists.5 Judges were not the
only people trapped in that world. The progressive reformer, as well, "spoke
of achieving a Horatio Alger world himself by smashing trusts and bosses. 26
Even Charles Beard was a child of "the American absolutism" who built his
histories around "a titanic struggle between 'conservative' and 'radical' which
had little relevance to Western politics as a whole."27
16. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OFTHE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1913); see NOVICK, supra note 13, at 96, 98.
17. Morton J. Horwitz, Progressive Legal Historiography, 63 OR. L REV. 679,679-80 (1984) [hereinafter
Horwitz, Progressive Historiography].
18. See NOVICK, supra note 13, at 240.
19. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT xxix (2d
ed. 1973).
20. See NOVICK, supra note 13, at 327-28, 333-34.
21. LOUIS HAMr, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 285 (1955).
22. RODGERS, supra note 14, at 8.
23. HARTZ, supra note 21, at 204-05.
24. Id. at 208-09.
25. Id. at 242-43.
26. Id. at 205.
27. Id. at 205, 236.
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As consensualism rose to dominance among historians, it also attained
hegemony over legal scholarship. The most important center for the new legal
consensualism was the Harvard Law School, where in the 1950's Henry M. Hart,
Jr. (1904-1969) and Albert Sacks (1920-1991) articulated an impressively
systematic and comprehensive model of the "legal process." Hart and Sacks
insisted that judicial decisionmaking, properly conducted, distinguished between
"substantive" and "procedural" realms. The substance of the law was a matter
for legislators and other popularly elected officials, who were subject to interest-
group politics and presumed to represent the entire social order. Questions of
"process"-- about which governmental body should decide and how--could
be objectively and neutrally determined. They were the proper domain of law
and the courts.
Legal process theorists had a significant impact on the writing of constitu-
tional history and judicial biography. The Lochner Court was the target of much
obloquy, but more for its usurpation of the legislative function than for the social
consequences of its decisions. Justice Louis Brandeis became a hero for his
judicial restraint and insistence on following neutral principles when exercising
the power of judicial review.29 The antebellum bench was scoured for common-
law judges who arrived at their decisions through a craftsmanlike process of
"reasoned elaboration."3 Roscoe Pound, dean of the Harvard Law School from
1916 to 1936, provided an influential example with his Formative Era of
American Law (1938), in which he praised Lemuel Shaw, John Bannister Gibson,
and Thomas Ruffin for defending the "taught legal tradition" against "the most
powerful political and economic forces of time and place." '31 When the legal
realist Walter Nelles argued that Shaw had decided a case in favor of a trade
union in order to defuse working-class radicalism, Pound rushed to defend his
hero (and the legal process). "It would have been quite impossible for American
judges trained in the common-law tradition, acting in the light of the received
ideals of the times, to come to any other conclusion," Pound declared. He then
counterattacked: "It seems to be impossible for a Marxian economic determinist
to comprehend an honest man. 32
Consensual approaches in history and law were still very much alive at
Harvard University when Morton Horwitz (b. 1938) arrived in Cambridge after
28. My summary of the legal process school follows Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's,
21 MICH. J.L. & Soc. REFORM 561 (1988); see also William W. Fisher 11, The Development of Modern
American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the Bill of Rights, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS 266,
297-301 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds., 1991); G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned
Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L REV. 279, 286 (1973).
29. See Clyde Spillenger, Reading the Judicial Canon: Alexander Bickel and the Book of Brandeis,
79 J. AM. HIST. 125 (1992).
30. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRocEss 165 (tent. ed. 1958).
31. ROscOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 82, 84 (1938).,
32. Id. at 87,88. On Nelles, who was not a Marxist, see Daniel R. Ernst, Common Laborers? Industrial
Pluralists, Legal Realists, and the Law of Industrial Disputes, 1915-1943, 11 LAw & HIST. REV. (1993)
(forthcoming).
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receiving his A.B. in 1959 from the City College of New York. He commenced
his graduate training in the Government Department and obtained his Ph.D. in
1964. He wrote his dissertation, The Problem of Tyranny of the Majority in
American Thought, under the direction of Louis Hartz.33 He then attended the
Harvard Law School, receiving his J.D. in 1967. After a year clerking for Judge
Spottswood Robinson of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, he returned to the Harvard Law School as a Charles Warren
Fellow and commenced work on his first book. Appointed to the Harvard law
faculty in 1970, he published Transformation in 1977, for which he received
the prestigious Bancroft Prize in American History the following year.4
Horwitz' work up to and including his first book is a remarkable deposit
of the academic era in which it was written. Transformation's first chapter, which
was the first part of the book to be published (in 1971), 5 was reminiscent of
the consensualism of his teacher, and, in particular, of Hartz' contribution to
the "Commonwealth" studies of the late 1940's and 1950's.36 Financed by the
Rockefeller Foundation, these studies took aim at critics of the New Deal by
arguing that, far from being "un-American," governmental promotion, of
economic development and regulation of economic activity dated from the birth
of the republic. The lesson of these works, as Horwitz observed in Trans-
formation, "was that there was no norm of laissez-faire and that, if anything,
laissez-faire ideology itself represented an aberrational strand in defining the
legitimate relationship between government and economy."37 To provide the
New Deal with "its own historical pedigree,"3 ' Hartz and his colleagues showed
how antebellum legislators advanced the broad, consensual goal of maximum
economic growth by means of a program of regulation and the granting of
franchises and monopolies. They devoted little attention to the distributive
consequences of these policies, an inquiry which might have led them to
incidents of sharp social conflict.
33. Morton J. Horwitz, The Problem of Tyranny of the Majority in American Thought (1964)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) [hereinafter Horwitz, Dissertation].
34. Richard B. Bemstein, Horwitz Wins 1978 Bancroft Prize for Law History Book, HARv. L. REc.,
Mar. 17, 1978, at 8. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., author of The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in
American Business (1977) and professor at the Harvard Business School, was co-recipient of the Bancroft
Prize.
35. Morton J. Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American Law 1780-1820,
5 PERSP. AM. HIST. 287 (1971).
36. See LOUIS HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860
(1948). The school was named after a book by Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Commonwealth: A Study
of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774-1861 (1947). See Arthur H. Cole,
The Committee on Research in Economic History: An Historical Sketch, 30 J. ECON. HIST. 723 (1970); Harry
N. Scheiber, Government and the Economy: Studies of the "Commonwealth" Policy in Nineteenth Century
America, 3 L INTERDISCIPLINARY HIsT. 135 (1972).
37. HoRwrrz, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 9, at xiii. Horwilz was specifically referring to HARTz,
supra note 36, and HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 36.
38. HoRwriz, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 9, at xiii.
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Read apart from the rest of Transformation-as it was by those who came
upon it in an historical periodical edited in Harvard's history depart-
ment-Horwitz' first chapter seemed more like a contribution to the project
of fashioning a legacy for liberal reform than a challenge to consensus history
from the left39 Horwitz argued that the emergence of an "instrumental" style
of legal reasoning by common-law judges was just as important as legislation
in "underwriting and channeling economic development." He attributed the
rise of instrumentalism to the widely-shared experience of framing state
constitutions in the revolutionary and early national periods. Even with Charles
Beard's example, Horwitz did not look for conflict in the constitution-making
process, and he did not investigate whether the disintegration of "the original
natural law foundation of common law rules" resulted in clearly discernible
groups of winners and losers4 Indeed, as Herbert Hovenkamp has noted, to
read the article alone "is virtually to conclude that the emergence of an
'instrumental' conception of American law was a good thing."4
When the article reappeared in Transformation, it was as the first chapter
of a neo-Beardian revision of the consensus history of the 1950's. The remainder
of the book stressed social conflict; its author had seemingly escaped "the
dogmatic business orientation of a nation 'born equal' that Hartz had found
omnipresent in America.43 While admitting some doubt, and (like Charles
Beard) never identifying winners and losers with much precision, Horwitz
ultimately concluded that "the tendency of subsidy through legal change during
this period was dramatically to throw the burden of economic development on
the weakest and least active elements in the population."
None of this struck professional historians as outrageous, as Horwitz' receipt
of the Bancroft Prize suggests. In fact, a book that used previously underutilized
sources to address a major scholarly debate was precisely the kind of work most
likely to impress professional historians. Among legal historians, however, the
reaction was, as Robert Gordon put it, one of "horror."45 In 1977 most of them
still believed that legal history should be written to produce something which
39. This may explain why a critic of Horwitz once commended the article to me as having been written
during "one of that madman at Harvard's lucid moments."
40. HoRWrrz, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 9, at 1, 288.
41. HoRwrnz, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 9, at 17. The article was a better fit with Gordon Wood's
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (1969), which argued that Americans came to embrace the
modem tenets of liberalism in the course of adopting and revising the first state constitutions. See Daniel
T. Rodgers, Republicanism: the Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11, 15-16, 18-19 (1992).
42. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Economics of Legal History, 67 MINN. L REV. 645, 674 n.123 (1983).
43. HARTZ, supra note 21, at 205; see NOVICK, supra note 13, at 415-68.
44. HORWhLZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 9, at 100-01.
45. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 97 (1984). An exception was
Willard Hurst, who lauded the book as "a first-rate monograph," but who preferred a more consensual
interpretation. "Along with sharp interest conflicts," Hurst wrote, "consensus, too, was part of the legal history
of 1780 to 1860." Willard Hurst, Book Review, 21 AM. . LEGAL HIST. 175, 175, 179 (1977); see Aviam
Soifer, Willard Hurst, Consensus History, and the Growth ofAmerican Law, 20 REVS. AM. HIST. 124 (1992).
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a future court may need or use, or to be of other service to the legal profes-
sion4 6 Given the difficulty of the subject-and the viciousness with which the
amateurs repulsed interlopers 4 -few historians were hardy enough to work
in the field and divert it from its premises in legal process theory.
In Transformaticn Horwitz mounted a frontal assault on this orthodoxy.
Even before the book appeared, Horwitz delivered a scathing attack on Pound's
history at an annual meeting of the American Society for Legal History.8 As
the first step in his demolition of the historical pedigree of the Lochner Court,
Beard had scoffed at George Bancroft for seeing "the movement of the divine
power" in the adoption of the Federal Constitution' Sixty years later, Horwitz
scored Pound and his epigones as the opening salvo of a full-scale attack on
the liberal-pluralist jurisprudence of the legal process school. Pound's lionizing
of judges who stood apart from political and economic strife overlooked the
fact that the "taught legal tradition" was itself a product of politics. Pound should
have acknowledged "the ideological character of professionalization," Horwitz
declared. Instead Pound offered his audience of lawyers the "special anti-Marxist
medicine" of an autonomous craft tradition to alleviate their anxiety over the
politics of law. He "pervert[ed] the real function of history by reducing it to
the pathetic role of justifying the world as it is."5
In Transformation Horwitz warned that the relative autonomy of law should
not be confused with "the self-justificatory claims of lawyers to mediate between
social forces in the interest of a -politically neutral law."51 To the contrary,
behind the legal change that Pound had attributed to the taught legal tradition
Horwitz saw an "alliance between intellect and power," that is, between elite
lawyers and "newly powerful commercial and entrepreneurial interests. 52
Reviewers charged Horwitz with unsuccessfully advancing a "conspiracy thesis"
and, in Poundian fashion, questioned whether his radical commitments prevented
him from accurately observing the past.53
With Transformation behind him, Horwitz set out to write "a very different
kind of book .... much less technical and much more directed at changes in
46. See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK:
A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776) xxxiii-iv (1944); WILLIAM E. NELSON & JOHN P. REID,
THE LrrERATURE OF AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 1-2 (1985).
47. See Stephen Botein, Scientific Mind and Legal Matter: The Long Shadow of Richard B. Morris's
Studies in the History of Law, 13 REVS. AM. HIsT. 303 (1985).
48. Morton J. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 17 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 275 (1973) [hereinafter Horwitz, Conservative Tradition].
49. BEARD, supra note 16, at 1 (quoting 2 GEORGE BANCROFT, THE HISTORY OF THE CONSITrUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 284 (1882)); see Horwitz, Progressive Historiography, supra note 17, at 679-80.
50. Horwitz, Conservative Tradition, supra note 48, at 281.
51. HORWrIZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 9, at viii.
52. Id. at 266, 258-59.
53. See, e.g., RandalU Bridwell, Theme v. Reality inAmericanLegalHistory:A Commentary on Horwitz,
The Transformation of American Law, 1790-1860 and on the Common Law in America, 53 IND. LJ. 449,
472 (1978) (book review); John P. Reid, A Plot Too Doctrinaire, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1307, 1311, 1321 (1977)
(book review). For defenses of Horwitz, see Holt, supra note 12; Gordon, supra note 45, at 97.
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legal theory.' ' 4 Crisis is such a work. Horwitz has by no means forsaken legal
doctrine; in fact, one of its best chapters reinterprets Santa Clara Co. v. Southern
Pacific Railroad,55 a landmark decision in corporation law. But Crisis is less
a history of American law than a history of highbrow legal thought; Horwitz'
focus has shifted from judicial chambers to the offices of law professors and
treatise writers. This change in setting is not the only reason why Crisis is (in
the words of Stanley Katz' blurb) "a surprisingly different" book than Trans-
formation. Horwitz' first book appeared in early 1977, the same year as the first
meeting of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, held in the spring in
Madison, Wisconsin. This event, which Horwitz helped organize, is particularly
important for understanding Crisis, for it marked the start of a lasting and
effective organization of radical legal academics. 6 Crisis is as much the product
of Horwitz' engagement with other law professors on the left as it is a
continuation of an attack on liberal or centrist variants of legal process theory.
In particular, the rise and fall of structuralism as the dominant methodology in
CLS histories of American legal thought is vital to understanding his new book.
Transformation was not, of course, a work of doctrinaire, "scientific"
Marxism; it did not dismiss law as epiphenomenal or endow only material forces
with causal significance. "Law is autonomous to the extent that ideas are
autonomous, at least in the short run," Horwitz wrote in the introduction;
elsewhere in the book he occasionally referred to "structure[s] of thought."
5 7
Moreover, in an essay published in 1977, he applauded Douglas Hay and Eugene
Genovese for bringing to legal history notions of hegemony and legitimation
borrowed from neo-Marxists in Western Europe.58 Yet in the eyes of other,
somewhat younger CLS scholars, Transformation still underestimated the causal
role of ideas. These CLS scholars thought in terms borrowed from the
structuralist anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss and the phenomenological
Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre. Thus, in announcing the founding of the
Conference on CLS to readers of Genovese's Marxist Perspectives, Mark Tushnet
(b. 1945) contrasted the instrumentalism of Transformation with the early
structuralist legal scholarship of Peter Gabel (b. 1947), Duncan Kennedy (b.
1942) and Roberto Unger (b. 1947).59
54. Bernstein, supra note 34, at 8.
55. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
56. John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391, 395-96 (1984).
57. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 9, at xiii, 30, 35.
58. "As the dogmatic shadows cast by Stalinism and the Cold War have gradually dissipated," Horwitz
wrote, "Marxists have finally begun to move away from those simplistic slogans by which thought was
dismissed as mere 'ideology' and by which law was treated contemptuously as a mere 'superstructure' that
simply 'reflected' class relations." Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good? 86
YALE LJ. 561, 563 (1977).
59. Mark Tushnet, A MarxistAnalysis ofAmerican Law, I MARXIST PERSP. 96 (Spring 1978). On Marxist
Perspectives, see NovicK, supra note 13, at 460.
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Kennedy's historical writings in the middle and late 1970's exerted the most
influence on Horwitz. As Joan Williams made clear in her lucid account of the
shifting epistemological claims of CLS scholars, Kennedy applied to legal texts
the aggressive interpretive methods that Levi-Strauss used to analyze myths.6
He billed his article 6n Blackstone's Commentaries as the first installment of
a history of American legal thought in terms of "the fundamental contradiction"
of the human condition--"that relations with others are both necessary to and
incompatible with our freedom."' Not only was that contradiction an aspect
of every legal problem, Kennedy declared, it was "the very essence of every
problem."6 2 Every legal epoch erected a "structure of legal thought6 3 to
mediate the fundamental contradiction. Because the contradiction was
unresolvable, the structures contained internal inconsistencies that became
increasingly apparent as time went on. Eventually, the entire structure gave way,
and a new one arose to take its place."
As Williams writes, "U]ust as Levi-Strauss claimed to have uncovered the
deep structure of all myths," in this passage Kennedy "claimed to have uncovered
the deep structure of all law.'65 To be sure, Kennedy hedged his bets. He
referred to his argument as "a shockingly crude model" and a "hypothesis"; he
included the "disclaimers" that his work was simply descriptive and ignored
"the question of what brings a legal consciousness into being, what causes it
to change, and what effect it has on the actions of those who live it.'6 6 Still,
the main implication of his argument, like those of the less deterministic variants
of structuralism sweeping American intellectual history, was that structures of
legal thought had enormous causal force.67
A second installment of Kennedy's history was the immediate inspiration
for Crisis' account of Victorian legal thought.68 The essay, part of a much
longer manuscript, described a classical "legal consciousness" that reigned
between 1885 and 1935. Classical jurists held: (1) that private individuals and
the various branches of government were the basic actors in the legal system;
(2) that each legal actor possessed power delegated from the sovereign to carry
out its will; (3) that an actor's will was "absolute within but void outside" the
actor's sphere of authority; (4) that the role of judges was to police the
60. Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New
Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429,464-69,472-79 (1987); see also Gordon, supra note 45, at 114-16, 118-20.
61. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 209, 213 (1979).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 221.
64. Id. at 213-17.
65. Williams, supra note 60, at 473.
66. Kennedy, supra note 61, at 213, 216, 220.
67. On intellectual historians and structuralism, see Rodgers, supra note 41, at 22.
68. Horwitz credits Kennedy with being "the first scholar to attempt to elaborate a structure of late
nineteenth-century legal thought" and to identify "the history of American legal thought as a coherent scholarly
field separate from constitutional history." P. 273 n. 1. Horwitz acknowledges that he has borrowed extensively
from Kennedy's work. Id.
1030 [Vol. 102: 1019
Critical Tradition
boundaries between these spheres; and (5) that judges could be trusted not to
usurp the authority of other legal actors so long as they arrived at their decisions
through a formal process of deduction from a priori principles of great generality
and abstraction. 9 Kennedy then turned to Rufus Peckham's majority and John
Marshall Harlan's dissenting opinions in Lochner for an illustration. With long
quotations but no discussion of Peckham's and Harlan's education, legal careers,
or political experiences, Kennedy argued that both men shared a common legal
consciousness that was more important to the case's outcome than was the
Beards' war between the people and the interests.70
Even before Kennedy's historical articles appeared, Tushnet had objected
to Kennedy's tendency to "reify structures of legal thought" and endow them
with "a life of their own that resisted transformation."' In the 1970's and
1980's historians outside of CLS published a number of studies of late-Victorian
legal thought premised on less idealistic and more eclectic intellectual constructs,
such as the "free labor ideology" of Eric Foner's influential study of the
Republican Party.72 Nevertheless, a band of critical legal historians launched
an ambitious voyage across late-Victorian law and jurisprudence and laid claim
to the entire field in the name of classical legal thought. With some variation
(including greater or lesser degrees of attention to "the fundamental contra-
diction"), Gregory Alexander, Robert Gordon, Wythe Holt, Elizabeth Mensch,
Rudolph Peritz, and Kenneth Vandevelde used Kennedy's formulation in studies
of corporate law, the Wall Street bar, judicial review of labor legislation,
property, trusts and estates, antitrust, and labor law.73 In addition, Mensch
69. Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of
Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. L. & SOC'Y 3, 7-8 (1980).
70. Id. at 9-14.
71. Tushnet, supra note 59, at 107.
72. ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970). Foner was heavily indebted to the anthropologist Clifford Geertz for his
understanding of ideology, not as "a rigid, doctrinaire, black-and-white understanding of the world, but,
rather, as the system of beliefs, values, fears, prejudices, reflexes, and commitments-in sum, the social
consciousness-of a social group." Id. at 4. Studies of late-Victorian legal thought in this tradition include
Michael L Benedict, Laissez-Faire andLiberty:A Re-Evaluation ofthe Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293 (1985); William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor:
Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 767; James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era:
Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. LJ. 257
(1989); Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some
Parameters ofLaissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897,61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (1975); Charles W. McCurdy,
The Roots of "Liberty of Contract" Reconsidered: Major Premises in the Law of Employment, 1867-1937,
1984 SuP. CT. HIST. SOC'Y Y.B. 20 [hereinafter McCurdy, Liberty of Contract]; Aviam Soifer, The Paradox
of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAW &
HIST. REV. 249 (1987); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325 (1980).
73. Gregory S. Alexander, The Transformation of Trusts as a Legal Category, 1800-1914, 5 LAW &
HIST. REV. 303 (1987); Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American
Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald L. Geison
ed., 1983); Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies'and Practices of New
York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51
(Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984); Wythe Holt, Recovery by the Worker Who Quits: A Comparison of the
Mainstream, Legal Realist, and Critical Legal Studies Approaches to a Problem of Nineteenth Century
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performed the invaluable service of producing a succinct and accessible survey
of "the history of mainstream legal thought" in Kennedyesque terms.74
As the structuralist enterprise steamed ahead, however, its captain jumped
ship. By 1983, Kennedy decided that structuralism had lost the destabilizing
value it once possessed, and he dropped it for a post-modem stance.75 As late
as 1980 Kennedy still maintained that legal structures integrated the diverse
elements of legal consciousness into fixed, formal arrangements that mediated
the contradictions of everyday life.76 Now he and a smaller circle of associates
argued that legal concepts were far too open-ended and plastic to be corralled
into structures. Having demolished the notion of logical necessity within legal
thought, they turned to social theory, arguing that its terms and concepts were
ambiguous and implied contradictory conclusions." All of this might have
opened Kennedy to the charge of anti-intellectualism (which Peter Gabel in fact
mockingly leveled at Kennedy in a published dialogue).7" Fortunately, an
imposing scholarly apparatus was at hand in post-modem literary and social
theory, and this provided the necessary cover for Kennedy and his compatriots
as they set out on a new search for the grail of authentic, unmediated human
connection.
Post-structuralist CLS has produced a legal history of its own, most
successfully in the work of Gary Peller (b. 1955).79 A full treatment of the
"critical tradition" in American legal historiography would have to study this
history in its own right. To understand Crisis, however, it is enough to know
that Horwitz considered post-strucmralism and, like most professional historians,
rejected it. As early as 1984 John Henry Schlegel could adopt a nostalgic tone
in describing CLS gatherings at which "the balding, almost elfin, Morty Horwitz"
defended "his limited version of the socioeconomic determinism of legal ideas
from the onslaught of his neighbor in Langdell Hall, Mr. Kennedy."8 And
in 1985 Horwitz published a study of corporation law in the Lochner era (now
the third chapter of Crisis) that committed his response to the post-structuralists
to print
81
Contract Law, 1986 WIs. L. REV. 677; Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in
THE PoLTCS OF LAW 286-87 (David Kairys ed. 1982); Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust
Law, 1990 DUKE LJ. 263. In Holt's case, the use of Kennedy's structuralism was for illustrative purposes
only; Holt preferred a less idealist account of the labor contract cases. Holt, supra, at 716-25.
74. Mensch, supra note 73.
75. Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14-16 (1986); see also
Williams, supra note 60, at 474-75; Fisher, supra note 28, at 289-90.
76. Kennedy, supra note 69, at 23-24.
77. Mark V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to Its Origins and Underpinnings, 26
J. LEGAL EDUC. 505, 510 (1986).
78. Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 75, at 5.
79. Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985); Peller, supra note
28.
80. Schlegel, supra note 56, at 402-03.
81. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L.
REV. 173, 175 (1985) [hereinafter Horwitz, Corporate Theory].
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Although he conceded the post-structuralists a realist antecedent in the form
of an article on corporate personality by the pragmatic philosopher John Dewey,
Horwitz nevertheless dissented from the position that abstract conceptions have
no "entailment in terms of more concrete legal doctrines or rules."
' 2 Rather,
Horwitz argued, "most important controversial legal abstractions do have
determinate legal or political significance. In the jargon of the current Critical
Legal Studies debate, I wish to deny that legal conceptions are infinitely
'flippable' and instead to insist that they do have 'tilt' or influence in
determining outcomes. 8 3 As "a matter of legal logic," the attack on formal
legal concepts was correct.' But in attempting to discredit orthodox claims
to "a non-political, non-discretionary mode of legal reasoning," the post-
structuralist approach, as Horwitz saw.it, ignored
the obvious fact that when abstract conceptions are used in specific
historical contexts they have more limited meanings and more specific
argumentative functions. We have spent too much effort repeating the
demonstrations of the indeterminacy of concepts in a logical vacuum;
but not enough time trying to show that in particular contexts the choice
of one theory over another is not random or accidental because history
and usage have limited their deepest meanings and applications.'
In the field of corporation law, for example, each of the two main concep-
tions of corporate personality (the "partnership" and "natural entity" theories)
"carried with them considerable legal and intellectual baggage that did not permit
random deployment or infinite manipulability."86 Horwitz concluded with a
call to make history speak to legal theory by "uncover[ing] the specific historical
possibilities of legal conceptions-to 'decode' their true concrete meanings in
real historical situations. ' 87
Horwitz maintains this position in Crisis. He notes the view among "scholars
in all fields of social thought" that claims to objectivity are in fact "contests
over the appropriate generality of discourse" and that "categories, theories, and
frames of reference" are contingent. He wisely observes that historians need
to be aware of such theoretical debates "without either solving the problems
or being paralyzed by them." Is the book "just my story, with all the connota-
tions of skepticism and subjectivity that the word 'story' implies?" Horwitz asks.
"No; I still aspire to give the best possible explanation, but without the wish
82. Id. at 175-76 (referring to John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality,
35 YALE U. 655 (1926)).
83. Id. at 175-76.
84. Id. at 176.
85. Id.
86. Pp. 106-07.
87. Id.; cf. p. 202 ("Yet it should be emphasized that this [Realist] critique of deductive reasoning does
not question the necessity of using concepts to bring order to experience. Rather, it is critical of concepts
only to the extent that they are so general as to be inherently random in their application.").
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to suppress all difficulties by intoning pieties about what a terrible place the
world would be without an objective account." '
With this aspiration, Horwitz has come to rest well within the outer limits
of the conventions of professional historians, who have overwhelmingly rejected
French structuralist nd post-structuralist methods for a position that "allowed
for contingency, stressed human agency, [and] was expressed in an 'empirical
idiom.' 8 9 To use terms suggested by Joan Williams, Horwitz' limited endorse-
ment of the indeterminacy thesis simply acknowledges the "implication of
modernism... that all histories are either presentist or boring" given "that every
interpretation reflects a particular viewpoint," and that all compelling historical
interpretations persuade "because they speak to current concerns." 9 On the
other hand, Horwitz' insistence on the existence of "tilt" and of "intellectual
and legal baggage"91 saves his undeniably politically engaged work from
embracing "bad" presentism-from producing a history that "cares so much
about the present that it ceases to concern itself with a conscientious respect
for the pastness of the past." 92
For my part, I tend to evaluate history in terms that are consistent with those
of Williams, if more metaphoric. Good historians, it seems to me, write to learn
something from the past about an abiding aspect of the human condition. The
historian strikes up a conversation with the past, just as the anthropologist in
the Geertzian tradition does her job by "plaguing subtle people with obtuse
questions.,,93 Properly conducted,- the conversation is two-sided and respectful.
The historian finds that much of what the- past has to say is of little or no
immediate use. The past, like a person with whom we converse, has other things
on its mind, events transpiring well before we arrived on the scene. The historian
should be sensitive to this context, because it gives meaning to what the past
has to say. By ignoring context the historian might overlook meaning that is
important for her own purposes. Moreover, if critics conclude that the missed
meaning was a vital part of the message of the past, they will feel free to attack
her history in absolute terms (even though at best they pronounce judgment
according to the reigning conventions of the historical profession). The historian
was not respectful of the past but rude, the critics will charge. She got her facts
wrong; what she produced may not be "nonsense, but neither is it history."''9
88. P. viii.
89. NOVICK, supra note 13, at 461, 598-605. Novick observes that at the influential wingspread
Conference on New Directions in American Intellectual History, "Levi-Strauss was mentioned only to be
put down" and Foucault, Derrida and other post-structuralists were, with few exceptions, either disparaged
or ignored altogether. Id. at 605-06.
90. Joan C. Williams, Culture and Certainty: Legal History and the Reconstructive Project, 76 VA.
L. REV. 713, 720, 744 (1990).
91. See Horwitz, Corporate Theory, supra note 81, at 173.
92. Wlliams, supra note 90, at 720.
93. CLIFFORD GEEKRZ, THE INTERPREFATION OF CULTURES 29 (1973).
94. Williams, supra note 90, at 720; see NOVICK, supra note 13, at 625-28.
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Just what questions the historian asks the past turns in some measure on
her own sense of what is most pressing in the world around her.95 Kennedy's
structuralist legal history, for example, addressed the radical concern that most
people took too much of the world for granted, that (in Gabel's words) people
experienced "falsely mediated forms of unity" which had to be called to mind
and then "broken through before people can in fact experience what's going
on between them in a real, honest, experiential way."96 By revealing the
determining force of structures in the past, Kennedy meant to flush out and
reveal as contingent comparable structures in the present.97 Given that purpose,
he felt no need to provide anything beyond the most cursory "background
information" on Blackstone in his study of the Commentaries. His reading paid
so little attention to context that he violated professional historians' sense of
fair play with the past. As a result, his study was attacked as bad history,
"interesting but wrong."
98
Structuralist historians sometimes sense that traditional narrative
histories-ones that follow the choices of individual actors in particular contexts
and therefore escape the anathemas pronounced on Kennedy-are the products
of historians located to their right on the political spectrum. That structuralist
historians want to call structures of thought to their readers' minds as the first
step in overthrowing them is, after all, what makes many of them radicals. In
fact, the past that many narrative historians recover is intended for use in a very
different present than the one radical structuralists inhabit, a present in which
people do the best they can in a world they can improve or worsen but not
remake.99 To the extent such narrative historians address a broad audience, they
write to provide their readers with useful analogies for the commonplace world
in which they live. They resist the implication that structures of thought
determine individual conduct or render individual variation essentially
uninteresting. What good is it to provide readers with thought-provoking
examples if they lack the freedom to act on them? If narrative historians grant
the structuralist point that what their subjects took as given was in fact
historically contingent, they do not make the demonstration of that fact the
central point of their accounts. They are more interested in chronicling the
diversity of human thought and action under constraint, which is how they
imagine their own social world.
95. If only her need to have a nice day. See J. H. HEXTER, The Historian andHis Day, in REAPPRAISALS
IN HISTORY 1 (1961).
96. Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 75, at 17-18; see also Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal
Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 73, at 286-87.
97. Robert W. Gordon described this process as making clear "the menace of historicity." Robert W.
Gordon, Summary of Discussion of Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE U. 1060, 1061 (1981).
98. Alan Watson, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 97 YALE U. 795, 795 (1988).
99. Cf. NOVICK, supra note 13, at 622. For a revealing exchange on structure ind contingency in the
context of early twentieth-century history of the regulatory state, see Gerald Berk, Corporate Liberalism
Reconsidered: A Review Essay, 3 J. POL'Y HIST. 70 (1991); James Livingston, A Reply to Gerald Berk, 3
J. POL'Y HIST. 85 (1991).
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H. CRISIS CRITIQUED
In Crisis, then, Horwitz continues his neo-Beardian, post-legal-process
history of American law, but he does so with a greater emphasis on revealing
structures of legal th6ught than he displayed in Transformation. "Every complex
legal system presents a structure of classification and categorization that reveals
many of its dominant concerns and points of tension and contradiction," Horwitz
explains in a section headed "Legal Architecture."'' He investigates those
structures for the same reason Kennedy did, to reveal the analogous assumptions
of the "legal orthodoxy" of the present. In particular, Horwitz has targeted "the
core of ideas that constitute the 'rule of law'-the conviction that there existed
a structure of impartial and self-executing norms suggested by the phrase 'a
government of laws, not of men."' 101 This is, as we have seen, an abiding
focus of his scholarship stretching back through Transformation and his essay
on Pound °2 to his dissertation on the problem of tyranny of the majority.10 3
Crisis commences its study of law as politics with a description of the
"structure of Classical Legal Thought." Horwitz presents the beliefs of late-
Victorian jurists in as reified and abstract terms as any work in the "Kennedy
school." His structure even comes complete with a Kennedyesque set of "points
of tension and contradiction," which will in time give way under the pressure
of social unrest3' With the stage set, Horwitz then proceeds to set forth the
first of the two main conflicts in the book. In the introduction he describes this
conflict as a clash between rival structures: on the one hand, "Classical Legal
Thought"; on the other, "Progressive Legal Thought," which originated in
Holmes' essays in the 1890's and culminated in the legal realist movement of
the 192 0 's. °5 It turns out in the remainder of the book, however, that hetero-
dox legal scholars enjoy much more independence of mind than their orthodox
counterparts. The progressives' beliefs appear in nothing like the structured idea-
systems of the classical thinkers; unlike their opponents, they are free to pursue
political ends unconstrained by a coherent, integrated structure of thought."6
This allowance for human agency permits Horwitz to present his second principal
100. P. 10; see also Morton J. Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 YALE LJ. 1825, 1835 (1987) ("All
legal systems have a legal architecture that categorizes and classifies legal phenomena. And every system
of legal architecture incorporates deep into that structure a set of normative premises about the proper way
to talk about law.").
101. P. 4.
102. Horwitz, Conservative Tradition, supra note 48.
103. Horwitz, Dissertation, supra note 33, at 9; see also Horwitz, The Meaning of the Bork Nomination
in American Constitutional History, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 655 (1989).
104. P. 10.
105. P. 3. For a caveat on Horwitz' use of the term "progressive," see infra note 300.
106. Horwitz is silent on this methodological double standard-structuralism and homogeneity for the
legal orthodoxy; contingency and diversity for the legal heterodoxy-but it seems to be an artifact of his
present concerns. In critical legal histories, it would appear that structuralism is the preferred methodology




conflict: a fundamental disagreement within legal realism over whether the ideal
of a neutral and apolitical rule of law could be salvaged from the wreckage of
classical legal thought and placed on the sounder foundation of modem social
science.
A. Victorian Legal Thought
"Although in every other field of American history," Horwitz writes,
"Progressive historiography, premised on a conflict between the 'people' and
the 'interests,' has been overthrown as simplistic, in the constitutional history
of the Lochner era it has continued to be the standard mode of explanation."'"
Crisis revises the progressive historians in two ways. First, Horwitz ties the
jurisprudence of the Lochner era to a particular social vision, one which bears
a striking resemblance to the "Horatio Alger world" of Hartz' nineteenth-century
America. Second, Horwitz attributes much more causal significance to ideas
than Charles Beard allowed.
In Horwitz' account, classical legal thought grew out of a coherent
understanding of American society and politics, which he dubs the "'old
conservative' world view."'l Old conservatives believed that decentralized
economic and political institutions-a "self-regulating, competitive market
economy presided over by a neutral, impartial, and decentralized 'night-
watchman' state"--were the fundamental conditions of American freedom."°9
As old conservatives, the Classical legal thinkers on the Lochner Court were
just as appalled as any progressive reformer by the rise of the giant business
corporation in the great merger wave of 1895-1904. They were not the willing
servants of corporate wealth that the progressive historians made them out to
be.l 0
Once it took shape, classical legal thought became relatively autonomous
from society and politics. Indeed, it powerfully influenced how lawyers and
judges interpreted the world around them. In setting out "the essential structure
of Classical Legal Thought," Horwitz follows Kennedy closely."' Classical
thinkers (1) sharply distinguished between "what was thought to be a coercive
public law-mainly criminal and regulatory law-and a non-coercive private
law of tort, contract, property, and commercial law";" 2 (2) believed that a
judge's only concern in a private law dispute was to vindicate the "pre-political
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executing and non-discretionary" through abstract and general classifications
that turned on clear, distinct, bright-line distinctions;.14 (4) assumed that
economic markets "reflected natural and impartial economic laws that needed
to remain uncorrupted by political interference";115 and (5) insisted that the
state must be "neutial" and "non-redistributive" in its conduct. 1 6
Two examples illustrate the value of Horwitz' approach. His account of
Lochner shows how late-Victorian jurists used the common law of nuisance
and constitutional doctrine on the police power to construct a bright line between
the rights of private individuals and the larger public against which legislation
could be judged. This resort to lines of cases previously treated as distinct shows
the classical jurists' penchant for systematizing large areas of the law. Further-
more, justifying public regulation by reference to the law of nuisance allowed
for the growth of modest administrative structures without upsetting the classical
commitment to a nonredistributive state. It even permitted classical jurists to
argue in Mugler v. Kansas'1 7 that the legislative prohibition of alcohol did
not redistribute wealth from saloon keepers to their opponents. Because saloon
keeping could be considered an offense against the public interest in health,
safety, and morals, prohibition simply corrected an unjust state of affairs-the
liquor-sellers' trespass on the rights of the public. In contrast, the ten-hours law
in Lochner could only be a redistributive act. The public-oriented justifications
offered on its behalf were merely a pretence for interfering in the essentially
private dealings of employers and employees. Horwitz thus provides a more
compelling political and moral explanation of Lochner than did Kennedy, and
he better relates the decision to the late-Victorian jurists' style of legal reasoning
than did earlier historians of judicial review in the Lochner era. 8
Even more original is Crisis' treatment of tort, contract, and property.
Perhaps the most striking illustration is found in Horwitz' discussion of classical
thinking about objective causation in tort. A progressive historian might be
forgiven for deciding that the question of how to assign causal responsibility
for the commission of a tort was too arcane to reveal much about the war
between the people and the interests. Horwitz, however, shows how the idea
of objective causation played "a central role in preventing the infusion of politics
into law."'1 9 He commences by reminding the reader that the aim of private
law in classical jurisprudence was to do corrective justice to private individuals
possessed of natural, pre-political rights. In tort law this would be possible only
if a court could objectively identify which person caused another's injury.




117. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).




act. The problem, as Holmes' friend Nicholas St. John Green recognized, was
that accidents commonly result from multiple causes. "If the question of which
of several acts caused the plaintiff's injury was open to judicial discretion,"
Horwitz asks, "how could private law stay clear of the dangers of the political
uses of law for purposes of redistribution?""
Horwitz finds an answer in Francis Wharton's Treatise on the Law of
Negligence (1878). While conceding the ambiguity of causation in the physical
world, Wharton argued that courts should distinguish between "physical and
moral forces.' ' . Wharton held that only the latter counted as causes for legal
purposes, and that jurists could distinguish moral causes from "merely consecu-
tive" ones, thanks to the determinate nature of moral law. Treating all ante-
cedents as causal, Wharton claimed, would lead to the ruin of the free market
system. Because one could always locate a capitalist who was in some way
responsible for an accident, he reasoned, actors with shallow pockets would learn
to act negligently, confident that they would be passed over "to reach the
capitalist who is a remoter condition."1 Rather than be held liable for all
disasters, capitalists would stop conducting business. "No factory would be built,"
and in time there would be "no capitalist to be found to be sued."1 Horwitz'
comment seems apt: "This seemingly sudden leap that Wharton makes from
the technical question of legal causation to his warning of the destruction of
capitalism is startling only if one fails to understand the systemic character of
legal thought in the late nineteenth century."'
If a structuralist approach to legal thought can produce insights such as these,
no further evidence of its value as a historical methodology is necessary. The
shortcomings of Horwitz' approach are worth noting, however. They suggest
the kind of insights to be gained from historians who are more willing than is
Horwitz to pursue the origins and limits of classical legal thought-or even to
concede that the thought of late-Victorian jurists was too diverse and contra-
dictory to be captured in anything as rigid and precise as a structure. Approached
in this spirit, late-Victorian jurisprudence looks significantly different from what
we see in Crisis. It appears better grounded in moral and religious thought and
more the project of a particular segment of Victorian society than a consensual
construct. Finally, a less structural approach to legal thought can produce a more
convincing account of the decline of late-Victorian legal thought than Horwitz
has provided.
Where did classical legal thought come from, anyway? As compellingly
as Kennedy's and Horwitz' structure accounts for much of the law between the
Civil War and the Great Depression, classical legal thought is, after all, an
120. P. 52.
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historian's artifact and not an historical phenomenon. Late-Victorian lawyers
and judges never learned its tenets in the static and systematic form they take
in critical legal histories. No single mind produced the cultural universe in which
these figures moved; no coherent, neatly-organized system of thought lay in
wait until the moment it could leap undisturbed into their minds.125 Yet once
one sets out to investigate where late-Victorian jurists found their ideas and why
they thought them useful, one quickly leaves behind the sweeping prospect
structuralism affords and descends into a jungle of contingency and detail.
A jungle, but not a chaos. Regularities and generalities await the historian,
but only if she is willing to think of late-Victorian legal thought in less
consensual and structured terms than does Horwitz. For Horwitz' account of
the late-nineteenth century is consensual: classical legal thought enjoys the
seemingly universal allegiance of the Victorian bench and bar.126 We would
have a more dynamic understanding of classical legal thought if we investigated
the breadth of support for its tenets rather than assumed its omnipresence. The
result of our investigations might not upset Crisis' premise that classical
jurisprudence obtained a hegemony over its rivals, any more than R. Kent
Newmyer's remarkable essay made the "New England legal culture" of Joseph
Story and the Harvard Law School appear any less influential during the
antebellum period. 27 The advantages of viewing late-Victorian legal thought
as the dynamic project of jurists from a particular class, region, and ethnicity
are important nonetheless. 128
Consider the example of Daniel Davenport, a lawyer born to well-to-do
parents in small-town Connecticut in 1852, educated at Yale College between
1869 and 1873, active in Democratic Party politics from before Grover
Cleveland's first presidency down to the triumph of the Silver Democrats in
1896, and lawyer to private individuals in their personal and commercial affairs
until the turn of the twentieth century. In 1902 he gave up his regular practice
to assume the leadership of the American Anti-Boycott Association (AABA),
a group formed by proprietary capitalists to bring test cases against organized
labor. A Horwitz-inspired historian who stumbled upon Davenport's speeches
for the AABA could easily mine them to show how the law of industrial disputes
instantiated the structure of classical legal thought. When those speeches are
125. For historians' growing doubts about structuralism in the historiography of the "republican ideology,"
see James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early
American Political Discourse, 74 J. AM. HIsT. 9 (1987); see also RODGERS, supra note 14.
126. This is analogous to Horwitz' account of eighteenth-century jurisprudence in Transfiormation, which
even a friendly reviewer felt he presented in overly consensual terms. Holt, supra note 12, at 704-07.
127. R. Kent Newmyer, Harvard Law School, New England Legal Culture, and the Antebellum Origins
of American Jurisprudence, 74 . AM. HIST. 814 (1987); see-also DANIEL W. HOWE, Victorian Culture in
America, in VICTORIAN AMERICA 3, 6 (1976).
128. One advantage of this approach is that it invites inquiry into how legal thought varied across regions.
Harry Scheiber faulted Transformation for not taking regional differences into account. Harry N. Scheiber,
Back to "The Legal Mind"? Doctrinal Analysis and the History of Law, 5 REvS. AM. HIST. 458,462 (1977)
(book review). The same criticism holds for Crisis.
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placed in biographical context, however, one can account for much content that
is ignored by or rests uneasily within structuralist histories. One can also develop
accounts of causal change that are more convincing and that better relate our
legal past to other branches of American history.
In a forthcoming book, I have tried to do this by putting Davenport's legal
thought in the context of developments in gender, politics and industry at the
turn of the twentieth century. If Davenport was representative of the college-
educated lawyers who dominated the bar associations and law schools of the
industrial Northeast and Midwest, his example calls for significant revisions
of the critical history of late-Victorian legal thought. What Davenport encoun-
tered as he prepared for the bar was nothing so coherent as a structure. In his
preparatory academy and at Yale he .read the classics of civic humanism,
discovering in them the ideas we now know of as the "republican ideology."
129
Under the guidance of William Graham Sumner, Davenport also read works
in the liberal tradition, such as textbooks on classical economics and Francis
Lieber's On Civil Liberty (1856): He learned of the natural rights tradition
through his avid interest in the revolutionary era. He also encountered, but
apparently failed to appreciate, the historicist learning his teachers had either
brought back from their studies in Germany, discovered in Lieber's book, or
found in Herbert Spencer's sociology. Finally, Davenport was still taught the
rudiments of common sense moral philosophy, in his case from Yale President
Noah Porter. Believing with Porter that God had endowed all human beings
with the same capacity for knowing right and wrong, Davenport did not hesitate
to measure human conduct against universal and immutable standards, to judge
public officials less by the consequences of their actions than the morality of
their intentions, and to treat social ills as the product of moral shortcomings
and human sinfulness. 3
If this or something like it was the diverse and potentially conticting cultural
inheritance that late-Victorians brought to the law, then some of the anomalies
left unexplained by Horwitz can be explained. Take, for example, the unabashed
moralism of Wharton's discussion of causation in his 1873 treatise on negligence.
Horwitz recognizes this as a problem, given his premise that classical jurists
distinguished sharply between objective law and subjective politics. If politics
could not produce determinate legal rules, then why in the world did Wharton
think morality could? Horwitz tells us that by the end of the century jurists
would downplay the "moral element in causation," thereby revealing "their own
skepticism about the objectivity of moral categories." He does not convincingly
129. See Daniel W. Howe, Classical Education and Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century America,
5 INTELL HIST. GROUP NEWSL (Intell. Hist. Group, New York, N.Y.), Spring 1983, at 9.
130. See Daniel R. Ernst, Davenport (June 25, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
The greater attention to formal education that I advocate here is similar to the approach employed in HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 (1991), although I would not confine myself
to highbrow economic thought and would admit to more contingency and diversity.
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explain why, well into the twentieth century, James Barr Ames-a classical jurist
if ever there was one-continued to believe that law should follow moral
precepts.
1 31
Once we look for the influence of moral philosophy, however, we can
account for the certaihty of Wharton and Ames, as well as judges like Stephen
J. Field.132 We can understand that a system of morality grounded in Protestant
Christianity was at least as important a source of their belief in the justice of
a priori rules as the notion that legal outcomes could (in Holmes' words) "be
worked out like mathematics from some general axioms of conduct." As Holmes'
The Path of the Law suggests, the "confusion between morality and law" was
the more widespread error, at least among Holmes' brethren on the Supreme
Judicial Court. "[T]he notion that the only force at work in the development
of the law is logic" was merely "the natural error of the schools,' ' 33 notably
the Harvard Law School of Christopher Columbus Langdell.
Another unexplained anomaly in Crisis is the coexistence in Victorian
thought of natural rights and historicist jurisprudence. At times Horwitz states
without qualification that classical jurists considered rights "natural" and "pre-
political." 134 Yet his chapter on Holmes acknowledges that Victorian legal
writers "as distinguished as Sir Henry Maine and as pedestrian as James
Coolidge Carter deified custom" and deployed it "as a conservative intellectual
construct... to neutralize or delegitimize legislative authority and to defend
the slow process of common law decision making under the guidance of
judges.' 35 Since Horwitz first gave the chapter as the Rosenthal Lectures at
the Northwestern University Law School in 1981, a flurry of articles have
demonstrated the influence of historicist thought on such important late
nineteenth-century treatise writers as Christopher Tiedeman, Thomas Cooley,
and John Norton Pomeroy.136 Read with Dorothy Ross' landmark history of
131. See James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARv. L. REv. 97 (1908). Horwitz attempts an answer
by discovering "a return to an individualistic morality" in the early twentieth century and argues that Ames
"revived a moralistic attack upon strict liability." Pp. 125-26. He offers no authority for the proposition that
orthodox legal thought in general or Ames in particular ever categorically rejected the moral underpinnings
of jurisprudence. Randall Bridwell accused Horwitz of inventing about-faces to explain the course of
antebellum commercial law in Transformation. Bridwell, supra note 53, at 493 n. 121. 1 regard the "revival"
of moralistic jurisprudence as another such invention.
132. RALPH H. GABRIEL, THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY SINCE 1815, at 216-27 (1940) (describing the philosophy of Judge Field).
133. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs, JR., The Path of the Law (1897), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167,
180 (1920) [hereinafter HOLMEs, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS]. Thus, Horwitz' claim that, above all, "late-
nineteenth-century orthodox legal thinkers" tried to "represent legal reasoning as fundamentally different
from political or moral reasoning" needs qualification. Pp. 198-99. Both middlebrow jurists and highbrow
legal scientists agreed that legal reasoning was fundamentally different from partisan politics. Many judges




136. RODGERS, supra note 14, at 152-55; Louise A. Halper, Christopher G. 7Tedeman, "Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism" and the Dilemmas of Small-Scale Property in the Gilded Age, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 1349,
1363-65 (1990); William P. LaPiana, The Legal Culture of the Formative Period in Sherman Act Juris-
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American social science and other works, 37 these articles suggest that historici-
st thought sprang from more diverse and diffuse sources than Darwin's Origin
of the Species or Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.
The recent studies leave many questions unclear. We do not know how many
Victorian lawyers and judges joined the academicians in sensing a conflict
between a Lockean view of rights originating in a pre-political state of nature
and a historicist understanding of rights as "created for the individual by laws
and institutions. '38 We do not know how many believed, with Noah Porter,
that the state could defend not only "the so-called natural rights of life, liberty,
and property" but also "the traditions of the past, the habits of the present, and,
above all.., the intelligence, the self-reliance, and the moral worth of the
people.' ' 139 We do not understand .what circumstances led some late-
Victorians-notably Supreme Court Justices Stephen Field, David Brewer, and
Rufus Peckham-to prefer natural rights arguments and others to prefer an
historicist jurisprudence.
Finally, we have no good idea what difference the two jurisprudential
approaches made in concrete cases. Some evidence suggests that historicistjurists
were more tolerant of new claims of authority for the state. Cooley, for example,
could easily bring himself to serve as the first chairman of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, which Brewer considered an abomination." The
historicist Holmes considered eugenics one of the demands the state could
legitimately make on its citizens. 4 In contrast, Daniel Davenport, a believer
in natural rights, opposed compulsory sterilization of the criminally insane.142
Yet even historicist thinkers could oppose novel uses of state power because
they believed the laws of history followed a certain, divine logic. This was true
of Sumner. He saw the United States developing teleologically toward the "more
prudence, 35 N.Y.L SCH. L. REV. 827 (1990); David N. Mayer, The Jurisprudence of Christopher G.
Tiedeman: A Study in the Failure of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 55 Mo. L REV. 93 (1990); Stephan
A. Siegel ,Historicism in Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Thought, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1431. As early
as 1967, Alan Jones objected to treating Cooley as a natural rights jurist, but Jones' work was overlooked
by the historians of classical legal thought. Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism": A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIsT. 751, 762-63 (1967).
137. DOROTHY Ross. THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 106, 112, 153-54 (1991); LOUISE
L STEVENSON, SCHOLARLY MEANS TO EVANGELICAL ENDS: THE NEW HAVEN SCHOLARS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA, 1830-1890 (1986).
138. WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, WHAT SOCIAL CLASSES OWE TO EACH OTHER 30 (New York, Harper
& Bros. 1883).
139. NOAH PORTER, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL SCIENCE 490-92 (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons
1885). Novack's recent work suggests that Porter's view enjoyed broad support. WILLIAM J. NOVACK,
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE STATE POLICE POWER: THE COMMON LAW VISION OF A WELL-REGULATED
SOCIETY (Institute for Legal Studies, University of Wisconsin at Madison, Legal History Program Working
Papers Series No. 2, 1989).
140. Jones, supra note 136, at767-77; SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE:
A STUDY OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1865-1901, at 128-29 (1956).
141. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927); see also Mary L. Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as
a Eugenic Reformer: Rhetoric in the Writing of Constitutional Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 833 (1986).
142. Letter from Daniel Davenport to W. 0. Burr (Dec. 6,1909) (on file with Yale University Archives).
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complete realization of a society of free men united by contract."143 Any social
practices incompatible with that ideal ran counter to the mainstream of historical
development and were illegitimate.
Crisis does not help us much with these matters. Horwitz offers a shrewd
and convincing assessment of the strategic value of historicism; for example,
he calls custom "a Rorschach blot onto which conservative social thinkers could
project their fantasies of a naturally harmonious society free from the twin
dangers of anarchy and coercion, yet capable of organic change and growth."'"
But his premise that classical legal thought existed as a coherent structure keeps
Horwitz from pursuing the diversity of Victorian jurisprudence. A narrative
historian might think that exploring this diversity could turn up crucial context
for the drawing of sensible analogies from the past. Horwitz apparently has
concluded that more context would simply obscure the "essential structure" of
thought and hamper the debunking force of his history."
One aspect of Crisis' treatment of Victorian jurisprudence makes matters
worse: Horwitz' somewhat vague and schematic explanation of the fall of
classical legal thought. His basic strategy is to argue that sweeping economic
or social development aggravated the internal contradictions of the structure until
a triggering event (the Lochner decision, according to the Introduction)
.precipitated a sustained, political, and progressive critique of the old order."
In Crisis, Horwitz advances a cataclysmic model of legal change. Like geologic
epochs, his legal eras begin and end in catastrophic events.
In Crisis, Horwitz identifies several different aggravating socioeconomic
forces. One candidate is the rise of the "business" or "large national"
corporation.147 "The large national corporation not only drew into question
the orthodox separation of public and private law," he writes at one point, "but
it also challenged the notion that modem property could continue to be
represented as a pre-political right and not as a creature of social choice.""'
Another is "the emergence of organizational society," a related but more general
development suggested in the work of Robert Wiebe, Ellis Hawley and
others.'49 Finally, and most emphatically, Horwitz argues in his chapter on
143. SUMNER, supra note 138, at 24; see FINE, supra note 140, at 84.
144. P. 123.
145. This is how I account for Horwitz' complaint that "the ratio of interesting theoretical generality
to undigested historical detail is too small" in E. P. Thompson's Whigs and Hunters. Horwitz, supra note
58, at 564.
146. P. 3.
147. Pp. 145, 167. The distinction may make a difference. The "business corporation" that in Chapter
Five generated valuable but "non-physical" property, flushing into the open "all of the contradictions that
had been barely suppressed in traditional doctrine," has been in existence since the antebellum period. P.
151. The large, nationally organized corporation with significant market power, which Horwitz seems more
frequently to have in mind, only became a regular feature of the industrial landscape after 1895.
148. P. 167.
149. Pp. 5,66. The "organizational synthesis" posits that the example of the large business corporation
encouraged a broad section of the American populace to pursue social order and stability through bureaucratic
structures and administrative expertise. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE GREAT WAR AND THE SEARCH FOR
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Holmes that the "radical social and economic conflicts of the 1890's"
permanently changed the course of American legal thought in two ways. First,
the appearance of great social unrest belied the existence of "widely shared
customary norms" (thus destroying a premise of historicist jurisprudence).
150
Second, the "emergence of fundamentally new problems" such as economic
concentration, labor strife, and "the shift from landed to intangible property"
highlighted "the internal inconsistency of natural rights conceptions.""
15 The
"widespread experience of Americans during the 1890s that the country was
falling apart," Horwitz concludes, "is perhaps the most important key to
understanding the shift in thought not only in law but in virtually every field
of intellectual inquiry."'5 2
None of this is unambiguously wrong. It might even be sufficient if
experience translated itself into thought uniformly and without the mediation
of culture and circumstance. The difficulty is that far too many lawyers and
judges ignored these great social events or found that they could account for
them without discarding their basic assumptions about law and life. Horwitz
rightly notes the appearance in the 1890's of the belief that society was to some
extent amenable to self-conscious attempts at social control. To the extent that
historicist jurisprudence assumed society developed organically, in response to
natural or divine laws, it lost adherents in the first decades of the twentieth
century.'53 What survived into the 1920's and beyond was the belief that social
processes had a life of their own and that they sometimes produced widely-
shared norms. If the mores of early twentieth-century social science lost the
gemeinschaftlich quality of .their counterparts in German historicism, social
process and social consensus continued to function as mediating forces between
natural rights individualism and democratic statism long after the triumph of
the corporation, the advent of organizational society, and the social upheavals
of the 1890's."
Rather than trace the persistence of consensualism in American legal thought,
Horwitz retains conflict as his main engine of historical change. Horwitz forsakes
Hartz and joins Charles Beard in seeing the progressive era as a period of
fundamental political struggle between progressive legal thinkers and anti-
corporate "old conservatives" and pro-corporate "new conservatives." Horwitz'
A MODERN ORDER 6-9 (1979); RICHARD L MCCORMICK, THE PARTY PERIOD AND PUBLIC POLICY: AMERICAN
POLITICS FROM THE AGE OF JACKSON TO THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 313-15 (1986); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE





153. Note, however, that James Coolidge Carter wrote Horwitz' exemplar of customary jurisprudence
in the twentieth century. JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNCTION: BEING
A COURSE OF LECTURES PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BEFORE THE LAW SCHOOL OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY
(1907).
154. See Ernst, supra note 32.
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use of the Beardian terms "conservative" and "progressive" succeeds in
underlining the political content of legal thought, but in light of later works of
cultural and political history the terms seem terribly blunt and somewhat
idiosyncratic. For example, Henry May's interpretation of the prewar era as the
end of American innocence is called by Horwitz the last days of a "Victorian
world view" before the skepticism and doubt of the 1920's. 5 5 Yet he never
shows us what was "conservative" or "progressive" in the thought of, say, James
Barr Ames or Roscoe Pound; what if anything they shared with Lyman Abbott,
a leader of the Social Gospel movement; or where either law professor differed
from a younger figure like Walter Lippmann. Horwitz' abstract approach raises
the specter of legal historians miring themselves in a parochial debate over the
content of old conservative, new conservative, progressive, and realist legal
thought-a repeat, if you will, of the quarrels over instrumentalism and
formalism Horwitz helped provoke with his first article. 15
6
Horwitz, of course, breaks no historical conventions in choosing to privilege
conflict over consensus. Historical eras are not innately conflictual or consensual.
They can be characterized as either, depending upon where the historian looks.
As we shall see, Horwitz' attempts to connect legal realism to political conflict
produce enormously valuable insights. One drawback of Horwitz' choice,
however, is that he leaves to other historians the work of sorting out the common
and the contested elements in early twentieth-century legal thought Only when
someone turns to the period without Horwitz' limiting assumptions, with more
interest in studying thinkers in their social and political contexts, and with a
greater desire to relate developments in legal thought to the history of social
thought and social science, will we understand how a progressive academician
like Pound and an outspoken conservative like Wignore could differ so sharply
on political matters and still reject Langdell's legal science as hopelessly
unrealistic.
B. Holmes Misplaced
It happens that Horwitz himself provides an excellent argument for
jettisoning the labels "conservative" and "progressive" in his extraordinary
chapter on Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.157 By pointing out the similarities in
155. P. 170; see HENRY F. MAY, The Rebellion of the Intellectuals, 1912-1917, in IDEAS, FAITHS, AND
FEELINGS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN INEuECIUAL AND RELIGIOUS HISTORY 1952-1982, at 3, 11 (1983); HENRY
F. MAY, THE END OF AMERICAN INNOCENCE: A STUDY OFTHE FIRST YEARS OF OUR OwN TIME, 1912-1917
(1959).
156. See William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles ofJudicialReasoning
in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974); Lynda Sharp Paine, Instrumentalism v.
Formalism: Dissolving the Dichotomy, 1978 Wls. L. REV. 997; Harry N. Scheiber, Instrumentalism and
Property Rights: A Reconsideration of American "Styles of Judicial Reasoning" in the 19th Century, 1975
WiS. L REV. 1.
157. Pp. 125-42.
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Holmes' thought to the customary jurisprudence of the Wall Street lawyer James
Coolidge Carter," 8 Horwitz shows that the longstanding debate about whether
Holmes was a "liberal" or a "conservative" was beside the point.
59 He was
neither, as those terms have come to be understood over the course of the
twentieth century, but something quite different: an elite believer in historicist
jurisprudence. This insight, combined with Horwitz' shrewd sense of the politics
of legal thought and his years of teaching torts at Harvard, has produced a
brilliant analysis of Holmes' The Common Law.
60
Horwitz offers this account of Holmes' great book as the first step in a larger
interpretation of the jurist's thought: "I believe it has never been argued that
in reality there is an early and a late Holmes," Horwitz writes, "and that his
own intellectual journey from The Common Law in 1881 to 'The Path of the
Law' in 1897 parallels a major change in American social, economic, and legal
thought and in the structures of legitimacy in the two periods.' '
16' In Horwitz'
interpretation, The Common Law represents the "early" Holmes, the Holmes
for whom consensual customs still mediated between law as "pre-political natural
right" and law as "the arbitrary command of the sovereign."'62 The "late"
Holmes makes his appearance after 1890 in the essays Privilege, Malice, and
Intent 63 (1894), The Path of the Law'64 (1897), and Law in Science and
Science in Law65 (1899), and in his famous dissents in the labor cases
Vegelahn v. Guntner166 and Plant v. Woods. 67
In Horwitz' telling, the dramatic changes in Holmes' thought can be seen
in the jurist's loss of faith both in custom as a standard for judging and in the
existence of "external standards" in the law of torts. Holmes came to doubt his
earlier positions on these two issues as he reflected on the alarming rise of
industrial concentration and industrial strife in the mid-1890's. 6 Well before
Lochner prompted a full-blown assault on classical legal thought, Holmes could
no longer ignore the contradictions inherent in that structure. Holmes' response
to his predicament was twofold. First, he dropped the belief in the existence
of stable, certain, and consensual customs and urged judges to acknowledge
the existence of interest groups and to engage in "direct policy analysis.',
169
158. P. 123.
159. See G. Edward White, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. CI. L. REV. 51 (1971).
160. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 123-25 (Boston, little, Brown & Co. 1881).
161. P. 110.
162. P. 116.
163. HOLMES, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 133, at 117.
164. See HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 133, at 167.
165. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 133,
at 210.
166. 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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In so doing, Horwitz argues, Holmes "pushed American legal thought into the
twentieth century.' 1
At the same time, according to Horwitz, Holmes made "a complete about-
face''171 in his thinking about the standards judges should apply in resolving
cases of intentional toits, such as the harm labor unions inflicted upon employers
in their strikes and boycotts. In The Common Law Holmes had argued that judges
should consult objective, external, customary norms rather than the moral
blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct. In Privilege, Malice, and Intent,
as well as in Vegelahn, and Plant, Holmes returned to "the traditional common
law subjective tests of 'malice' and 'intent' he had attacked in his earlier
work. 7 2 In Horwitz' view, Holmes' insistence that malice was material to
both the prima facie case in tort and to the defense of privilege marked "a major
retreat from the idea of the external objective standard that Holmes had always
regarded as his major contribution to legal theory."'
173
This account of Holmes' renunciation of customary jurisprudence and
external standards in tort misdescribes Holmes' historicism and overlooks
evidence that the jurist remained a historicist throughout his career. Horwitz
also misstates the role Holmes envisioned for social science in legal education,
which was much less prescriptive than Horwitz suggests. Holmes' thinking about
external standards did change after the start of his judicial career, but the shift
was nothing like the dramatic volte-face Horwitz sees. It commenced earlier
than Horwitz allows and is evident in cases having nothing to do with labor
strife. Holmes never treated the subjective intent of the defendant as an element
in the prima facie case for intentional torts, although as a judge he treated it
as one factor to be considered in determining whether the defendant's conduct
was justified. Holmes' own characterization of this position as a "supple-
ment" 74 to his chapters on torts in The Common Law seems more accurate
than Horwitz' description of a "complete about-face."' 5'
Holmes wrote the essays of the 1890's not to abandon the historical
jurisprudence of his early legal scholarship but to correct his brethren on the
Anglo-American bench when they attempted to evade their responsibility as
historical jurists by invoking an abstract proposition they claimed to have derived
from--of all things-Holmes' own work. The dictum that malicious intent could
never make a lawful act unlawful was, to the Holmes of the 1890's, just as
wrongheaded as the view he attacked in The Common Law--that moral





174. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Frederick Pollock (June 26, 1894), in I HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS 54 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1946).
175. P. 133.
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for the proper inquiry: determining which litigant represented the preponderant
social force in the great historical struggles of the day. If this inquiry sometimes
led Holmes to a posture of "judicial self-restraint,"
1 76 the philosophy behind
it was very different from that behind the legal process school's deference to
the bargaining of interest groups.
The difference between Holmes' historicism and the judicial restraint of
legal process scholars is worth noting, if only because of the continuing
importance of many decisions Holmes wrote while on the Supreme Court. This
seems particularly true in the field of regulatory takings, where as recently as
last term Justice Scalia cited Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Company
v. Mahon'7 in support of aggressive judicial review of 
land-use regulation.
7 8
Horwitz' willingness to attribute to Holmes the liberal pluralism of mid-century
jurisprudence suggests that Justice Scalia was right to treat Mahon as consistent
with the work of the legal process theorists who taught him at the Harvard Law
School in the late 1950's. 179 In fact, it was the product of a judge who thought
he could strike down legislation when, in his independent estimation, it ran
counter to the forces of history.
1. Holmes' Historicism
Horwitz commences his chapter on Holmes by characterizing the jurist's
predicament in The Common Law as "a two-front war." On one front, Holmes
"challenged orthodox legal theory for its moralism and individualism, qualities
that... unrealistically ignored the actual regulatory functions of law."
180 On
the other, Holmes opposed unbridled, Austinian legislative supremacy, because
this would produce "a redistribution of wealth in the interest of the general
welfare."' 18' Horwitz then turns to Carter and convincingly shows how custom
addressed both concerns in his work. "[Custom served both to defeat the
democratic impulse for legislative supremacy," Horwitz writes, "and, at the same
time, to avoid the potential anarchy of a common law based solely on individual
natural rights.' ' 8 2 The Common Law, Horwitz writes, was a similar attempt
to find "a middle position through the mediating notion of custom."
' In
support of this claim Horwitz cites passages that certainly suggest Holmes
believed the law to be the product of a natural evolutionary process rather than
a system of morality or the command of an all-powerful state. Horwitz offers
176. P. 142.
177. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
178. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2892 (1992).
179. See Peter B. Edelman, Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence and the Good Society: Shades of Felix
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no quotation, however, in which Holmes describes that process as Carter did,
in consensual terms.
Having established to his satisfaction that the early Holmes believed law
to be grounded in widely-observed custom, Horwitz turns to some of the most
familiar passages in the Holmes oeuvre to argue for a dramatic change in the
judge's thought. They fall into two categories: (1) acknowledgements of social
conflict; and (2) calls for lawyers to study not only history but also statistics
and economics.
Horwitz' first example of Holmes' recognition of social conflict is the
famous rebuke in The Path of the Law to lawyers who believe that questions
such as whether to imply a contractual term could be settled through a process
of logical deduction. "Such matters are really battle grounds where the means
do not exist for determinations that shall be good for all time," Holmes wrote,
"and where the decision can do no more than embody the preference of a given
body in a given time. ' " Horwitz comments: "For Holmes the customary
theory of law had collapsed. Law is the product of social struggle. Nothing
stands between the state and the individual. ' ' Several pages later Horwitz
quotes Holmes' remark in Privilege, Malice, and Intent that the issue in labor
cases "really comes down to a proposition of policy of rather a delicate nature
concerning the merit of the particular benefit to themselves intended by the
defendants," a question which judges with "different economic sympathies" might
well decide differently.' Horwitz observes: "Here, for the first time, Holmes
suggests that there may be no neutral way of deciding between the claims of
labor and of capital." 187 Finally, Horwitz repeats Holmes' position in his
Vegelahn dissent that the harm workers inflict upon employers in simple, "mine-
run" labor disputes was privileged for the same reason as loss incurred in
business competition. According to Holmes, both were part of the "free struggle
for life."'88
Horwitz also relies on Holmes' comments on legal education. The Holmes
of The Common Law, Horwitz points out, was convinced that a historical survey
of the development of various legal doctrines would reveal fundamental legal
principles, yet in The Path of the Law Holmes accorded history a critical place
only in "the rational study of law." "It is the first step toward an enlightened
scepticism, that is, towards a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of...
rules." Once historical analysis drew the jurist's attention to the existence of
a particular rule, he needed to bring other skills to bear to reach the proper
conclusion. "For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the
man of the present," Holmes wrote, "but the man of the future is the man of
184. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 133, at 181.
185. P. 130.
186. Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 133, at 128.
187. P. 132.
188. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080-81 (1896) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
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statistics and the master of economics."'' 9 With this comment, Horwitz argues,
"the source of experience has shifted from custom to policy" in Holmes'
thought.'" Henceforth the only ground of judicial decisionmaking he would
consider was "direct policy analysis." 191
The Path of the Law, in Horwitz' estimation, "marks the first clear
articulation of legal positivism-that is, an insistence on a sharp distinction
between law and morals-by any American legal thinker."192 Convinced that
"law is merely politics," forswearing his "search for immanent rationality in
customary law," Holmes took up "the mantle of judicial self-restraint for which
he became famous eight years later in Lochner v. New York."' 93 Once "interest
group conflict had replaced historical evolution as the key to understanding the
law," it was for the legislature to weigh and measure the various competing
interests." Horwitz thus paints the late Holmes much as a legal-process
theorist would, as a liberal pluralist who deferred to the political bargains worked
out in legislative settings.' 95 Horwitz completes this portrait of Holmes by
citing Arthur Bentley's Process of Government (1908), the work commonly
considered the first full-length study of pluralism in American political
thought.
9 6
One problem with Horwitz' account is that he equates Carter's consensual,
custom-centered jurisprudence with Holmes' more conflictual and nonteleological
historicism when he should have treated the two as species of the larger category
of late-Victorian historical jurisprudence. Both men believed that natural
historical processes mediated between natural rights and legislative absolutism,
but Carter understood that process to be the consensual production of custom,
while Holmes understood it as a fierce, Darwinian struggle. Holmes conceived
of social conflict not as a lesson of the 1890's but as a conviction dating from
the start of his professional career. This thrice-wounded veteran of the Civil
War never believed that society could fairly be understood in consensual terms.
Most historicist legal thinkers, as Stephen Siegel notes, believed that
"societies, social norms and institutions evolve according to moral ordering
principles that are discoverable through historical studies."'97 Without this
premise of an immanent morality in history, evolutionary models of social
development would have accorded too small a role for divine will to make much
headway among the Protestant elite. They would also have provided Victorian
189. HOLMES, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, in COLLEcrlE LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 133, at 187.
190. P. 141.
191. P. 127.
192. P. 140. This claim is in some tension with Horwitz' earlier argument that classical jurists sought
to separate law and morals.
193. P. 142.
194. Id.
195. Cf. HARRY H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 24-25 (f968) (noting Holmes'
belief that courts should privilege labor activities in pursuit of self-interest).
196. P. 142 n.242.
197. Siegel, supra note 136, at 1438.
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thinkers with no basis for condemning novel social practices, for any such
practice could be justified as an adaptation to novel social circumstances. Herbert
Spencer's writings would never have enjoyed the enthusiastic reception they
received in the United States had Spencer not declared his laws of social
evolution to be the 'will of God. 8
In contrast, as Siegel suggests, Holmes rejected the divine teleology which
most of his fellow Victorian jurists needed to square evolutionary thought with
Protestant theology.199 Holmes' history was a blind, amoral process, much
like war. He studied the legal past not to detect the hand of God, whose
existence he doubted, but as a naturalist, with "a harshness in his judgments
upon men of good will, a contempt for humanitarianism as an ingredient of
public policy, and an expressed preference for the predatory type of individual
that his friends usually managed to overlook with embarrassed silence."
Thus, while Holmes admired Spencer, he thought the Englishman's insistence
upon a divine first principle was "a singular anomaly" in a theory of "the natural
development of institutions by successive adaptations to the environment." '
As a judge, Holmes considered his sole job to be determining whether one
side or the other represented the dominant social force of the day. He once
proposed as his epitaph, "Here lies the supple tool of power.' '2 2 When Holmes
detected no deep-rooted controversy on a particular issue he spoke of that social
force in consensual terms. As early as 1873, however, Holmes clearly acknowl-
edged that judges sometimes confronted the task of determining whether
legislation actually represented the dominant of two or more conflicting social
tendencies.
This discussion of judging amidst social conflict came in a comment on
proposals to revise the English law of conspiracy following a successful
prosecution of London "gas stokers" in 1872.2m American judges had long
condemned legislation that favored one social group at the expense of another
as a violation of the natural and equal rights of citizens.2 Holmes felt that
this "class legislation" doctrine was premised on a false assumption, "the
solidarity of the interests of society." All one could require was "that
legislation should easily and quickly, yet not too quickly, modify itself in
accordance with the will of the defacto supreme power in the community, and
198. See FINE, supra note 140, at 32-46.
199. Siegel, supra note 136, at 1546-47.
200. STOW PERSONS, AMERICAN MINDS: A HISTORY OF IDEAS 285 (1958).
201. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Herbert Spencer: Legislation and Empiricism, in JUSTICE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES: His BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS 106-07 (Harry C. Shriver
ed., 1936) [hereinafter Legislation and Empiricism].
202. MERLO J. PUSEY, 1 CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 287 (1951) (quoting Charles Evans Hughes,
Biographical Notes).
203. See MARK D. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS, 1870-1882, at
42-47 (1963).
204. See Benedict, supra note 72, at 327-31.
205. Holmes, Legislation and Empiricism, supra note 201, at 107-08.
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that the spread of an educated sympathy should reduce the sacrifice of minorities
to a minimum."' Legislation would inevitably serve the "more powerful
interests" which triumphed over their unsuccessful competitors. "[L]ike every
other device of man or beast," Holmes concluded, "[legislation] must tend in
the long run to aid the survival of the fittest."
How should judges do their job given the fact of social conflict? In common
law cases, courts should give effect to the greater of the historical forces
implicated in the dispute. Thus, in Law in Science Holmes explained that
doubtful cases presented judges with "a conflict between two social desires, each
of which seeks to extend its dominion over the case, and which cannot both
have their way.'"ses Judges may defer to precedent in such cases "because one
or the other desire may have been expressed in previous decisions to such an
extent that logic requires us to assume it to preponderate in the one before" them.
Where the precedent is doubtful, "judges are called on to exercise the sovereign
prerogative of choice."2 9
Here, and in Vegelahn,2 '0 Holmes was doing nothing so banal as urging
deference to the bargains of interest groups. Rather, he was calling upon judges
to defer to history, to "the organization of the world, now going on so fast,"
a tendency plain from "the most superficial reading of industrial history," one
which would be "futile to set our faces against."" 1 In the field of labor
disputes, this fatalism generally implied that courts should refrain from
intervening in nonviolent labor disputes, although Holmes did believe judges
could act to defend some overriding social interest. "[W]hen the power of either
capital or labor is exerted in such a way as to attack the life of the community,"
Holmes once wrote, "those who seek their private interest at such cost are public
enemies and should be dealt with as such.
212
In passing on the constitutionality of a statute, judges normally could assume
that the legislation was an authentic expression of a dominant social force, but
it was always open to them to resolve this "empirical" question against the
legislature. "I always say that I regard legislation like buying a ticket to the
theatre," he wrote Franklin Ford in 1911. "If you're sure you want to go to the
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in .COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 133,
at 239.
209. Id.
210. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 1081.
212. Holines made this remark in a draft opinion in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S.
229 (1917). Writing Sir Frederick Pollock two years later in the midst of a postwar stiike wave, he regretted
he never published the sentiment, although he also thought steel magnate Elbert Gary should recognize the
unions in his industry. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Frederick Pollock (Oct. 26, 1919) in 2
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETERS, supra note 174, at 28.
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show and have money to pay for it there is an end of the matter. I may think
you foolish to want to go, but that has nothing to do with my duty."
213
To see what Holmes meant by a judge determining whether a legislative
majority in fact "had the money to pay for" a statute, consider his decisions
under the Takings Clause while on the Supreme Court. Decided long after
Horwitz' "late Holmes" should have taken the stage, the cases show the Justice
deferring to custom, traditions, and history. In Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San
Francisco,214 for example, Holmes upheld a statute forbidding burials within
the city and county of San Francisco. How far a legislature could go in restricting
the use of property consistent with the Constitution was not, Holmes observed,
44a question for pure abstract theory alone. Tradition and the habits of the
community count for more than logic." Long before "the making of constitutions,
regulation of burial and prohibition of it in certain spots" were common in the
Western world. Holmes concluded, "The plaintiff must wait until there is a
change of practice or at least an established consensus of civilized opinion before
it can expect this court to overthrow the rules that the lawmakers and the court
of his own State uphold. 215
Holmes made a similar argument in Jacknan v. Rosenbaum Co. 216 in
upholding a Pennsylvania statute that empowered one landowner to place half
of a party wall on the land of a neighbor. Holmes noted that the statute was
based on a "custom" that dated from the first settlement of the state and had
prevailed ever since.217 "If a thing has been practised for two hundred years
by common consent," Holmes wrote, "it- will need a strong case for the
Fourteenth Amendment to affect it." 8 Were the statute an innovation, he
suggested, he might have found it to have effected a taking of the neighbor's
land. "But if, from what we may call time immemorial, it has been the
understanding that the burden exists, the land owner does not have the right
to that part of his land except as so qualified."219
In contrast, Holmes struck down a statute in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon' that transferred a well-recognized property interest (the right of
support) from the owners of mineral rights and to the holder of the surface estate.
Holmes decided that the statute in question was an innovation. Was it nonetheless
valid as a defense of an overriding common interest, such as the public safety
that justifies tearing down a house to stop the spread of fire? That, Holmes
213. Letter fromOliverWendellHolmes, Jr., to Franklin Ford (Apr. 6, 1911), in id. at44 n. 38. Holmes
claimed that his thinking on the subject had not changed since his days as an editor of the American Law
Review. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 24, 1914), in id., at 44 n.38.
214. 216 U.S. 358, 366 (1910).
215. Id.
216. 260 U.S. 22 (1922).
217. Id. at 31.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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wrote, was a "question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by
general propositions." '221 Horwitz argued that similar language in Privilege,
Malice, and Intent signalled Holmes' loss of faith in the possibility of objective
or external standards." 2 In Mahon, however, Holmes was quite confident of
his ability to divine in tradition, custom, and existing social practices the line
beyond which "regulation goes too far" and becomes a taking.213 A year earlier,
after upholding a rent control statute in Block v. Hirsch, 4 Holmes scoffed
at Justice McKenna, who had filed a vigorous dissent: "[Hie not infrequently
recurs to the tyro's question: Where are you going to draw the line?-as if all
life were not the marking of grades between black and white."' No tyro,
Holmes decided that the rent control statute in Block "went to the verge of the
law" but fell short.226 The act in Mahon, he concluded, went too far." 7
With the benefit of hindsight, of course, one can glimpse the origins of
interest-group pluralism in Holmes' writings, including those from before the
1890's. But turning Holmes into a pluralist runs counter to the mainstream of
the history of American social science, which holds that pluralism did not
succeed as a descriptive political model until the 1920's, and as a normative
theory until mid-century."8 It also leaves the Mahon case a mystery. If Holmes
was a pluralist, why did he not uphold the statute, as the pluralists Louis
Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, and Dean Acheson believed he should have?229
If we understand Holmes' opinion as belonging to an older jurisprudential
tradition then perhaps Mahon would be less valuable than it is to today's
opponents of land-use regulation, for whom it remains an important
precedent.' 0 In sum, Horwitz' depiction of the late Holmes as a liberal pluralist
is an anachronism. Horwitz would not have tricked himself into making it but
for his assumption that the 1890's had immediate, cataclysmic consequences
for American legal thought.
Horwitz' attempt to turn Holmes into a proponent of "direct policy
analysis"" similarly rushes the jurist too quickly into modem times. As
Dorothy Ross has shown, historicism was a transitional phase in American social
thought. It rejected claims to the timelessness and divine origin of the social
221. Id. at 416.
222. P. 132.
223. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
224. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
225. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold Laski (May 8, 1921), in I HOLMES-LASKI
LETrERS 331-32 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1953).
226. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.
227. Id.
228. RODGERS, supra note 14, at 176-211; Ross, supra note 137, at 330-39; John Gunnell, The
Declination of the State (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
229. Brandeis blamed Mahon on Holmes' recent prostate operation. See Joseph F. Dimento, Mining
the Archives of Pennsylvania Coal: Heaps of Constitutional Mischief, 11 J. LEGAL HIST. 396,415-18 (1990).
230. See. e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2892-93 (1992); Carol M.
Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL L. REV. 561 (1984).
231. P. 127.
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prescriptions of moral philosophers without fully endorsing the ambitious,
positivistic claims of twentieth-century social science. It helped reorient social
thought from inquiries into human nature to studies of the physical world, but
it did not endow humans with much power to change the course of history."2
For most elite Vict6rians, social control amounted to (in Sumner's phrase) an
"absurd effort to make the world over."' 33 In this respect, Holmes recognized
Sumner as a kindred spirit. Both men counselled that social circumstance
determined human affairs; neither held out much hope that humans could change
the course of history.'
Holmes' discussion in the 1890's of the relative merits of history and
economics in legal education illustates this point. In general, his essays evidence
no waning of interest in historical jurisprudence.235 In The Path of the Law,
Holmes did award the legal future to "the man of statistics and the master of
economics, ' ' 36 but this remark should be read with Holmes' elaboration two
years later in Law in Science. Legal rules should only be recognized insofar
as they help advance "a social end which the governing power of the community
has made up its mind that it wants. ' 'n7 History had a real if limited value in
revealing the original purpose a legal rule addressed. Lawyers could then
independently determine whether the original purpose was still important or,
if not, whether the rule advanced some new purpose of equal social
significance."
The role Holmes proposes for social science in this passage is not the
aggressive social engineering of Horwitz' "late" Holmes. To the Holmes of Law
in Science, social science was valuable insofar as it helped judges with a
descriptive task: discovering what social ends the governing power of the
community desires. Without social science, the judges could rely only upon
formulaic maxims or their own "often blind and unconscious" estimates of the
relative strengths of conflicting social ends. 9 What statistics and economics
promised was not a basis for judges to impose their own desires upon society.
Judges should not "undertake to renovate the law," Holmes insisted. "That is
not their province." Rather, "the only way to solve the problem presented
232. Ross, supra note 137, at 91-97.
233. William Graham Sumner, The Absurd Effort to Make the World Over, in I ESSAYS OF WILLIAM
GRAHAM SUMNER 91 (Albert G. Keller and Maurice R. Davie eds., 1934).
234. PERSONS, supra note 200, at 268-69; see also Gary J. Aichele, Self-Preference, Competition, and
the Rule of Force: The Hobnesian Legacy, 1988 S. CT. HIST. SOC'Y Y.B. I1, 15-16 (collecting Holmes
quotes).
235. On several occasions he traced the evolution of legal doctrines just as he did in The Common Law.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 160, at 183-84; HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law,
in COLLECrED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 133, at 214-16.
236. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECrED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 133, at 187.
237. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 133,
at 225.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 242.
240. Id. at 239.
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is to weigh the reasons for the particular right claimed and those for the
competing right . . as well as one can, and to decide which set
preponderates." 241 We may doubt the possibility of making this decision
without permitting our own desires to alter the outcome. Holmes did not.
2. Holmes and Malice
One of Horwitz' great strengths as a legal historian has been his insistence
on illustrating his "transformations" in American law with examples drawn from
the workaday doctrines of lawyers and treatise writers, as well as formal and
self-conscious works of jurisprudence. Torts, the field of private law he knows
best, provides Horwitz with his most convincing examples.
2 Not surprisingly,
then, Horwitz completes his portrait of Holmes as the prescient observer of the
crisis of classical legal thought by drawing upon the jurist's writings on standards
of liability in tort. This time, however, Horwitz' discussion is much less
persuasive. His self-imposed burden of discovering a dramatic change in Holmes'
thinking in the 1890's has led him to exaggerate the change in Holmes' theory
of torts and to overlook an explanation for this shift that had little to do with
the social unrest of the decade. This explanation was Holmes' changing attitude
toward "continuous, logical, philosophic exposition
' '  in legal analysis.
Systematic argument was extremely important to the young scholar striving to
produce a tour de force in The Common Law. It was much less important for
the sitting judge, forced to make up his mind at his peril on "a living
question."
In his lectures on tort in The Common Law, Holmes was most concerned
with the first of Horwitz' two fronts: the moralism and individualism of Kant,
Rousseau, and the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, and of the middlebrow moralists
of the Victorian bench.245 Holmes advanced his famous notion of "external
standards" to make two different assaults on this position.' First, he took
aim at the moralists' claim that in deciding legal issues judges should consult
some a priori system of morals grounded in the natural rights tradition. "[The
law does still and always, in a certain sense, measure legal liability by moral
241. Id. at 242.
242. See, e.g., Horwitz' reading of Francis Wharton's views on objective causation, disucussed supra,
text accompanying notes 121-124.
243. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Speech at a Dinner Given to Chief Justice Holmes By the Bar
Association of Boston on March 7, 1900, in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES 122, 123 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1962).
244. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 133,
at 224; see William A. Lundquist, Comment, Oliver Wendell Holmes and External Standards of Criminal
and Tort Liability, 28 BuFF. L. REV. 607, 623 (1979); Mark V. Tushnet, The Logic of Experience: Oliver
Wendell Holmes on the Supreme Judicial Court, 63 VA. L REV. 975, 978-79 (1977).
245. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 160, at 77-163.
246. 1 am indebted to Horwitz for the point that Holmes conflated these two meanings of "external
standards" in The Common Law. P. 136.
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standards ... " Holmes acknowledged. 7 Yet this moral standard was not
some elaborate ethical system, such as Kant's elaborate deductions from the
impossible axiom that people must be treated as ends in themselves. Rather,
the source of law was an "objective," "external" standard, morality as "generally
accepted." as found in the "actual feelings and demands of the community,
whether right or wrong."24 Holmes would restate the point in The Path of
the Law: 'The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its
history is the history of the moral development of the race."249 But the morality
of the community was "not coextensive with any system of morals. For the most
part it falls far within the lines of any such system, and in some cases may
extend beyond them, for reasons drawn from the habits of a particular people
at a particular time," 250
Holmes also used the term "external standards" to attack the Victorian
judges' assumption that the moral blameworthiness of defendants was the
ultimate reason why the law held them liable for tortious or contractual wrongs.
As a rule, legal liability was only remotely connected to the moral condition
of the defendant or his actual state of mind. "[T]he tendency of the law
everywhere is to transcend moral and reach external standards" of liability. 25
Thus, Holmes argued that judges punished unintentional acts not because the
actor was blameworthy, but because the actor had failed "to comply with fixed
and uniform standards of external conduct, which every man is presumed and
required to know.' 1 2 Pushing his insight to the limit, Holmes even attempted
to argue that subjective intent was immaterial-in such intentional torts as fraud,
slander, libel, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy253 It is important to note,
given Horwitz' use of The Common Law as the initial position for Holmes' later
"about-face," that the jurist conceded that the case law did not bear him out.
This was particularly true for conspiracy, the action upon which much of the
law of industrial disputes rested before the New Deal.' The most Holmes
claimed was that "it would be a strong thing if the presence of malice made
any difference" in intentional torts. 5
Horwitz argues that the 1890's cases involving business and labor combina-
tions led Holmes to renounce his notion of "external standards" as a source of
law and a test of tortious liability. In Privilege, Malice, and Intent and in his
labor dissents, Horwitz writes, Holmes returned to "the traditional common law
247. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 160, at 38.
248. Id. at 44, 41.
249. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 133, at 170.
250. Id. at 172.
251. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 160, at 135.
252. Id. at 111.
253. Id. at 130-63.
254. Id. at 142-43.
255. Id. at 145.
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subjective tests of 'malice' and 'intent.' '' 56 Without "empirically determinable
customary norms," Horwitz writes, Holmes found it "difficult, if not impossible,
to construct external standards to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
forms of competition." 7 He therefore "sought in the concept of 'malice' a
mediating force that custom could no longer provide."
8 Thus, Horwitz
believes Holmes urged his judges to adopt a wholly subjective standard in
deciding labor cases such as Vegelahn and Plant: "Allow the privilege to injure
whenever the defendant is furthering his own interests through economic struggle,
but deny the privilege where harm is inflicted simply for the purpose of injuring
the plaintiff."5 9 Under this standard, Horwitz argues, trade unions would
generally escape liability, because the trier of fact would rarely be able to find
the requisite element of personal ill will toward an employer. To this extent,
Holmes "was justly a hero to the next generation of Progressive social
reformers. ' 26
Horwitz' claim that Holmes completely renounced the notion of external
standards cannot be reconciled with Holmes' continued use of the concept in
Privilege, Malice, and Intent and later writings. Horwitz implies that Holmes
made subjective intent the sole consideration in determining whether the workers'
intentional infliction of harm was justifiable in Vegelahn and Plant. In fact, the
jurist urged his brethren to treat the purpose of labor combinations as one factor
in deciding whether the defendants' conduct could be justified in terms of the
external and objective requirements of the community. This modest change in
Holmes' tort theory was well underway before the social unrest of the 1890's.
Holmes' doubts about the extent to which external standards explained the
law of intentional torts grew with his years on the bench. Two cases in particular
led him to conclude that the subjective mental state of a defendant was relevant
in determining whether to privilege intentionally inflicted harm. One was
Morasse v. Brochu,261 in which Holmes joined a decision holding that a
physician had a good cause of action against" a priest who had intimated that
he would not administer last rites to his parishioners while they were under the
same roof as the plaintiff.6 2 The other, Tasker v. Stanley,' 3 was a suit for
the alienation of a wife's affections. Holmes upheld the introduction of evidence
that the defendant had advised the wife honestly and in good faith. "[l]n order
to make a man who has no special influence or authority answerable for mere






261. 25 N.E. 74 (1890).
262. Id. See also letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Frederick Pollock (Mar. 17, 1898), in I
HOLMES-POLLOCK LE-rERs, supra note 174, at 82.
263. 26 N.E. 417 (1891).
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to appear that the advice was not honestly given, that it did not represent his
real opinions, or that it was given from malevolent motives."
A labor dispute seems to have prompted Holmes to prepare a formal
statement of his new position on malice and privilege. Temperton v. Russell265
was an English case upholding a damage suit against unions in the construction
industry over a secondary boycott. Holmes thought the case should have been
governed by Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co.,2 66 in which the
loss inflicted by a combination of businessmen was held to have been privileged.
After Mogul, Holmes wrote the eminent English jurist Sir Frederick Pollock
that only "class sympathy" could explain the result in Temperton. To model
a sounder, historicist approach to intentional torts, Holmes prepared what he
termed "a supplement to the notion of the external standard which I have
gradually worked out in a series of decisions."'
. Holmes commenced Privilege, Malice and Intent by restating the greater
part of his chapters on torts in The Common Law. In determining whether a
plaintiff had made out a prima facie case, he wrote, "[t]he standard applied is
external, and the words malice, intent, and negligence, as used in this connection,
refer to an external standard." Only when the judge reached the issue of
justification would Holmes permit him to consider actual malice.268 As Holmes
later wrote in Aikens v. Wisconsin,' on this issue the defendant could not
argue that his motive was immaterial and that "the standards of the law are
external. That is true in determining what a man is bound to foresee, but not
necessarily in determining the extent to which he can justify harm which he
has foreseen." 270
Furthermore, even in questions of privilege, Holmes never viewed the
presence of actual malice as dispositive. In Privilege Malice, and Intent, Holmes
explained that the extent of a defendant's privilege was "a question of policy"
and turned not on "empty general propositions" but on the peculiarities of
particular cases. Sometimes, as in disputes over "spite fences," the defendant's
conduct was privileged regardless of motive.27 Sometimes, as in disputes over
medical advice, the loss occasioned was actionable if offered out of actual ill-will
toward a plaintiff.
272
264. Id. at 150.
265. [1893] 1 Q.B. 715.
266. Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., [1889] 23 Q.B.D. 598.
267. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Frederick Pollock (June 26, 1894), in I HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 174, at 54.
268. HOLMES, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 133, at 119.
Holmes consistently followed this protocol in his tort decisions while on the Supreme Judicial Court.
Lundquist, supra note 244, at 623.
269. 195 U.S. 194 (1904).
270. Id. at 204.
271. HOLMES, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 133, at 120-21.
272. Id. at 124-25. "[Jlustifications may vary in extent according to the principle of policy upon which
they are founded," Holmes wrote in Aikens. 195 U.S. at 204. While some, such as "those affecting the use
of land, are absolute ... others may depend upon the end for which the act is done." Id. (citation omitted).
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Holmes was troubled by several American cases excusing business
combinations from liability under the "abstract proposition" that malice could
never make unlawful an otherwise lawful act.273 This struck Holmes as being
as indefensible an evasion of the judge's duty to consult the dominant social
forces as the position that malice was always the test of liability, which he
attacked in The Common Law. Sometimes, "serious legislative considerations"
such as "the organization of the world" 274 demanded that judges ignore motive;
sometimes they demanded that judges take motive into account. 275 In Privilege,
Malice, and Intent Holmes thus distinguished between external sources of law
and external standards of liability more clearly than he had in his earlier work.
He more willingly acknowledged a role for subjective motive in justifying
intentional torts than he did in The Common Law. He otherwise restated his
belief in external standards of liability, and he in no way qualified his belief
in external sources of law.
Several years later, another widely noted English labor case prompted
Holmes to return to the subject.276 "[1ln the elaborate, although to my notion
inadequate, discussion which took place," Holmes wrote, "eminent judges
intimated that anything which a man has a right to do he has a right to do
whatever his motives, and this has been hailed as a triumph of the principle of
external standards in the law, a principle which I have done my best to advocate
as well as name." 2' This development threatened to turn what Holmes had
offered as an antidote to a priori reasoning in The Common Law into a new
"unreal" and "inadequate" generality.28 The only way to resolve the issue
of justification was to weigh the "grounds of policy and.., histories" on either
side of the question and decide which set prevailed.279
Holmes followed his own advice while on the Supreme Judicial Court in
his two greatest labor cases. In Vegelahn he noted that the defendants had
picketed their employer in order to win "a victory in the battle of trade" and
not to inflict damage for its own sake.28 Rather than stop there, Holmes went
on to weigh other "considerations of policy and of social advantage,""1 most
notably the tendency toward combination, apparent from even "the most
superficial reading of industrial history." Given the inevitable fact of combination
on the side of capital, he concluded, the organization of labor was necessary
if the battle between employers and employees was to be conducted "in a fair
273. HOLMES, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 133, at 122-23.
The cases were Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me. 225 (1883); Payne v. W. & Ad. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884).
274. HOLMES, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 133, at 129.
275. Id.
276. Allen v. Flood, [ 1898] App. Cas. 1; see James Barr Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because
of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 HARV. L. REV. 411, 411-12 (1905).
277. HOLMES, 'E COMMON LAW, supra note 160, at 241.
278. Id. at 229.
279. Id. at 241.
280. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
281. Id.
10611993]
The Yale Law Journal
and equal way.''2s2 In Plant, Holmes similarly inquired into the object of the
defendants' conduct, but, as in Vegelahn, his decision ultimately turned on the
industrial conditions of his day.2
In his account of Holmes then, as in his account of late-Victorian legal
thought, Horwitz weit astray because of his assumption that the social conflict
of the 1890's doomed all attempts to ground law in consensual norms, and
because he did not listen when his subjects attempted to explain why they wrote
what they did. After reading Crisis, one imagines Holmes wrote Privilege,
Malice, and Intent Newton-like, after being hit by a striker's brick. Social change
provided Holmes with occasions for his essays and opinions in the 1890's, but
he intended them to join ongoing debates about the nature of law that were not
revolutionized by the Homestead Strike, Coxey's Army, the Pullman Boycott,
or the rise of the holding company. Holmes viewed the momentous events of
the 1890's in terms of a historicist jurisprudence that he retained with remarkable
tenacity throughout his professional career. His example suggests the need for
a less schematic understanding of legal change than the structuralist model
Horwitz offers in Crisis.
C. Realist Legacies
"It is a curious phenomenon of American scholarship," writes Joyce Appleby,
"that everyone wants Jefferson on their side." The same might almost be
said of the legal realists. Edmund Kitch has called law-and-economics scholarship
an outgrowth of the realist's research agenda;' G. Edward White has awarded
the realist legacy to the law-and-society movement;m Mark Tushnet has
dubbed CLS in its structuraiist phase the "direct descendant of American Legal
Realism"; 7 and Gary Peller believes that when radical legal thinkers take the
post-structuralist turn they find themselves face-to-face with Felix Cohen and
Robert Hale." s Horwitz joins this scramble for the realist aegis with an
interpretation that professes to connect the movement to "the real political
282. Id. at 1083.
283. Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015 (1900) (Holmes, CJ., dissenting).
284. Joyce Appleby, Historians, Community and the Pursuit ofJefferson: Comment on Professor Tomlins,
4 STUD. Am. POL DEv. 35,41 (1990).
285. Edmund W. Kitch, The Intellectual Foundations of "Law and Economics," 33 J. LEGAL EDUc.
184 (1983).
286. G. Edward White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual History, 40
Sw. LJ. 819 (1986).
287. Tushnet, supra note 77, at 505.
288. Peller, supra note 79, at 1219-40. Judge Richard Posner is more reluctant than Kitch to claim the
legal realists for the law-and-economics movement. The realists' unsystematic, "liberal meliorism," he writes,
makes the relation between the two movements equivocal at best. RiCHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE 441-42 (1990).
Critical race and feminist legal scholars sometimes cite the realists in acknowledging that their post-
realist position in legal thought. As a rule, however, they have looked elsewhere for inspiration. See, e.g.,
Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 988-89 (1990).
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struggles" 9 of the day and that casts legal realism as "a continuation of the
reformist agenda of early-twentieth-century Progressivism."2 °
Horwitz' creation of a realist legacy for his own position within CLS has
produced some of the most exciting and engaging writing in Crisis. In these
passages we see a historian looking to the past for a conversation about an issue
that has fascinated him since his days as a graduate student: how it happened,
"in this most democratic country in the world;" that Americans came to endorse
the ideal of a government of laws and not men.
91 Horwitz is especially
intrigued by how many of the same realists who convincingly debunked the
apolitical pretensions of late-Victorian jurisprudence thought they could avoid
their elders' mistakes simply by making the law conform more closely to social
conditions. Horwitz' heroes are legal. realists who doubted this positivistic
reconstructive project. Espousing some form of epistemological relativism, these
figures rejected the distinction between fact and value. They understood "the
social and historical contingency of structures of thought,"
'292 and they
recognized that even the proponents of "sociological jurisprudence" were
compelled to acknowledge and defend their political and moral values.
293
In Crisis the epistemological relativists receive ample time to establish the
radical potential of their views. With the exception of Karl Llewellyn, legal
realists who thought social science could provide a workable and neutral basis
have little opportunity to explain themselves. Horwitz believes the latter have
already received too much attention in previous studies of the realists. Laura
Kalman, Edward Purcell, John Henry Schlegel, and others have so exaggerated
the realists' enthusiasm for social science, Horwitz writes, that the "critical thrust
of Realism has been virtually smothered." '2 We have been left with a vision
of legal realism as an adjunct of "naively behavioralist" social science, while
"the most significant legacy of Realism" 295-- that is, "the socially constructed
character of frames of reference, categories of thought, and legitimating
concepts"296-- has been largely ignored.
My quarrel with Horwitz' interpretation is less with his presentist aims than
with the dogmatic way in which he pursues them. He insists on a dichotomous





293. See pp. 173-74.
294. P. 182; see LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); EDWARD A. PURCELL,
JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOcRATIC THEORY: ScIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 74-94,
159-78 (1973); John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular
Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 195 (1980); John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism
and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459 (1979); G. Edward White,
From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century
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Critical or Scientific. 297 He etches the two positions in structuralist terms
as a rigid framework of inescapably connected concepts. Horwitz has ordered
a variety of realist texts into rival formations that bear a striking resemblance
to a CLS scholar's understanding of troop alignments in the current warfare
between leftist and liw-and-economics scholars at the Harvard Law School. In
the process, he has downplayed or ignored aspects of legal realist thought that
would upset the order he has imposed. In particular, Horwitz underestimates
the importance of a third position within legal realism, a continuation of the
historicist tradition in American law, albeit updated in light of pluralist theories
of society. For all the strengths of his treatment of the realists, Horwitz'
assumption that evolutionary theories of law ended with the 1890's obscures
the valuable legacy of the realists' pioneering efforts to envision a role for law
in a plural world.
Horwitz commences his account of the legal realists generously enough,
by insisting that their ranks be broadened beyond those named on Llewellyn's
famous list.298 He argues that we should devote less time to exploring differ-
ences between legal realism and Roscoe Pound's "sociological jurisprudence"
and more time to envisioning both movements as part of a larger whole,
"Progressive legal thought."2 99 In Horwitz' usage, "Progressive jurisprudence"
denotes not just the legal phase of the reform movement that appeared before
World War I. It extends over the first four decades of the twentieth century and
includes not only the legal realists of the 1920's and 1930's, but also prewar
figures like John Chipman Gray, Pound, and- Harlan Fiske Stone; institutional
economists like Richard Ely, John Commons, and Thorstein Veblen; the
philosophers John Dewey, Morris Cohen, and Felix Cohen; such "sophisticated
doctrinal critics" as Francis Bohlen, Jeremiah Smith, and Fleming James; and
the administrative lawyers Felix Frankfurter and John Landis.
300
According to Horwitz, Lochner provoked Pound and other reform-minded
law professors into firing the first salvoes in a broad assault on late-Victorian
jurisprudence. Pound's work in particular set out "the basic consequentialist
297. P. 208. Two CLS scholars who studied legal history with Horwitz at Harvard have previously
published accounts of the legal realists that anticipate Crisis in important and imperfectly acknowledged
respects. Gary Peller distinguished between "Realism as Critique" and "Realism as Science," in an article
published in 1985. Peller illustrated the former "strand" of legal thought with selections from Hale and the
Cohens; he illustrated the latter with references to Llewellyn's writing. Peller, supra note 79, at 1219-59.
Three years later Joseph Singer devoted much of his review of Laura Kalman's Legal Realism at Yale to
stating Hale's and the Cohens' "attack on the public/private distinction or the attack on the idea of the self-
regulating market." Joseph W. Singer, LegalRealism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465,475 (1988) (book review).
In Crisis, Horwitz refers to Singer's essay as the "interpretation whose perspective I most share." P. 308
n.7. He cites Peller's article only in a chapter on postwar legal scholarship. Id. at 338 n.47.
298. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1222, 1226-27 n.18 (1931); see N. E. H. Hull, Some Realism about the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange over
Realism: The Newly Uncovered Private Correspondence, 1927-1931, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 921.
299. P. 171.
300. Pp. 182-85. 1 should add that Horwitz does not consistently reserve the term "Progressive legal
thoughf' for the generic category. At times it refers exclusively to work published before the First World
War. See, e.g., p. 189.
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critique of orthodox legal doctrine," namely, that judicial decisions were lagging
behind the needs of industrial America, that "the law in the books" bore only
a distant resemblance to the "the law in action."301 Progressive legal thinkers
from Pound through the legal realists agreed that the judges were consulting
their own moral and political agendas, when they should have considered how
the law they made would function in society. The progressives differed sharply
on a remedy.
One set of reformers, Horwitz' "scientific realists," decided that the courts
needed "a purer and more neutral system of legal concepts." 2 They proposed
a jurisprudence in which "law became the dependent variable, society the
independent variable."3 3 To know society better, they turned to social science
for expert guidance,304 a disastrous decision in Horwitz' judgment. "Behavioral
and value-free social science not only suppressed the moralism of early
Progressive social science," he writes; "it was also dependent on a completely
naive view of social thought."3 5 With the mustering of many legal realists
and their students into the New Deal, the scientific strand of legal realism
legitimated the rise of the bureaucratic state and pushed social reform "into a
starkly technocratic mode."3 6
Horwitz' critical realists, in contrast, believed the legal orthodoxy had erred,
not in permitting its morals and politics to infect the law, but in embracing the
wrong kind of morals and politics. These realists "[b]arely conceal[ed]" their
political commitments as they set about the task of demonstrating the
indeterminacy of orthodox legal reasoning.30 7 Most were not moral relativists,
and in fact drew upon "a reservoir of political and moral outrage at the injustices
of the old order."30" Their writings were above all contributions to the cause
of reform.
Horwitz makes a strong case for the radical potential of critical realism by
tracing attacks on natural rights jurisprudence from the historicist Holmes to
the law professor Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld to the lawyer and institutional
economist Robert Hale. Horwitz starts with Holmes' argument in The Common
Law that "[lI]egal duties ... come before legal rights."3 '9 By insisting that
rights and duties were correlative and by asserting that historically defined duties
were the basis for evaluating a priori claims of right, Holmes mounted a sharp
challenge to the natural rights tradition.310 He would also inspire Hohfeld, who





306. Morton J. Horwitz, Book Review, 75 1 AM. HIST. 299, 299 (1988).
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developed the point into his famous taxonomy of "fundamental legal
conceptions."31' Horwitz writes that Hohfeld's dismantling of property into
a bundle of rights, privileges, powers, and immunities "seems to have been"
motivated by the growing use of injunctions in the labor disputes of the
progressive era. In any event, Hohfeld's system won him a job at Yale and the
praise of other reform-minded law professors, who eagerly employed it to contest
the formal logic of the judges and the notion of property as "a pre-political,
Lockean natural right.
' 312
After Hohfeld's death in 1918, Hale developed his system into a full-blown
attack on the "naturalness of the market."3 13 Hale argued that because buyers
and sellers took for granted a set of legally created entitlements, no economic
exchange was truly voluntary. Public and private were not distinct spheres in
American society; rather, the public realm recognized private rights as it saw
fit. Ownership was not a natural right but a delegation by public authority to
private individuals of "a discretionary power over the rights and duties of
others.""31 Economic regulation was not a coercive intrusion by the state into
the private sphere of individual rights but the substitution of one form of state-
sponsored coercion for another. With Hale's articles and Morris Cohen's
"Property and Sovereignty," Horwitz concludes, property law was recast as a
species of public law.315
The insight that property and markets are human artifacts is of continuing
importance, and not simply for CLS scholars in search of a pedigree, but for
all defenders of economic regulation against challenges framed in libertarian
terms. Perhaps only someone with Horwitz' political commitments could have
recovered that legacy and presented it so well. Yet even taken on its own neo-
Beardian terms, Crisis has its shortcomings. I will note three: Horwitz' failure
to detail the positions of his critical realists on the political issues of their day,
his equation of enthusiasm for Hohfeld's system with a politically progressive
stance, and his refusal to acknowledge that even his favorite realists slid back
into empiricism and functionalism in proposing constructive reforms. Each
shortcoming results from Horwitz' structuralist indifference to the context that
was part of the meaning his subjects attributed to their texts. Leaving that context
unexplored permits Horwitz to sidestep aspects of his critical realists' thought
that would lessen their value as role models for contemporary legal scholars
on the left.
311. Pp. 128-29; see WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING (1919). On Hohfeld's system, see Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical
Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, 986-94.
312. Pp. 197, 155.
313. P. 194.
314. P. 164 (quoting ROBERT L. HALE, RATE MAKING AND THE REVISION OF THE PROPERTY CONCEPT
214 (1922)).
315. P 165; see Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 COPNELL L.Q. 8 (1927).
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The first shortcoming goes to the peculiarly abstract and bloodless way in
which Horwitz connects legal realism to the "real political struggles" of early
twentieth-century America. 16 From his criticism of the existing literature, one
might have expected Horwitz to detail the way in which the realists used their
legal theories in commenting on or participating in the great reform causes of
the day. Surely without such examples we cannot determine whether the realists
themselves derived from their work the political positions Horwitz has discovered
there. The only figure whose political activities Crisis describes at any length,
however, is Karl Llewellyn. His vigorous effort in the Sacco-Vanzetti crusade
provides little support for Horwitz' claim that realists like Llewellyn
"subordinated political and moral passion to social science expertise. 31
7
As far as it goes, Horwitz' research supports his claim that the critical
realists considered themselves reformers of one sort or another. Some, like Hale,
who received hate mail over the "Bolshevick ideas" he published in the American
Bar Association Journal, were even perceived as dangerous radicals by their
contemporaries. 3 8 But the mantle of reform covered a wide range of political
positions in early twentieth-century America. Lumping the critics of legal
orthodoxy together as "progressives" obscures distinctions that made a difference.
For example, Horwitz dubs Hohfeld a progressive on the basis of his enthusiasm
for Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom 9 Can we infer that Hohfeld supported
Wilson in his refusal to exempt organized labor from the Sherman Antitrust
Act?320 If so, then why should he be classed with the realist Leon Green, who
made a critical-realist case for the sit-down strike that would have horrified
Wilson?321 In fact, and as I will argue, realists in both of Horwitz' camps were
ambivalent about the legal program of the labor movement. Rather than permit
the critical realists to voice their misgivings, Horwitz preserves their heroic
stature by rendering their politics in abstract and general terms.
For similar reasons, I think, Horwitz does not explore a more narrowly
"political" function Hohfeld's system performed in the 1910's and 1920's, that
of demarcating the boundary between law professors and the rest of the legal
profession. When Hohfeld wrote, full-time law professors were still actively
vying with practitioners for control of legal education. Many saw in his system
just the kind of elegant and arcane learning that could support the professoriat's
claim to a special competence beyond the ken of the judge or practicing
lawyer.322 That Hohfeld himself saw a link between his system and the
316. P. 170.
317. Pp. 209-10.
318. Letter from Lawrence C. Brooks to Robert L. Hale (Jan. 4, 1923), quoted in Gerald Fetner, The
Law Teacher as Legal Reformer: 1900-1945, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 508, 528 (1977).
319. P. 152.
320. ARTHUR S. LINK, WILSON: THE NEW FREEDOM 432-33 (1956), Dallas L. Jones, The Enigma of
the Clayton Act, 10 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 201, 207-14 (1957).
321. Leon Green, The Case for the Sit-Down Strike, 90 NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 24, 1937, at 199.
322. For this reason Schlegel has called Hohfeld's system "the lynch pin of the grand vocation for the
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professionalization of law teaching became clear when he outlined his "Vital
School of Jurisprudence and Law." This was in 1914, the same year Wigmore,
a social conservative, defended the "specialist in legal science" from the academy
of the Wall Street bar.3 3
The legal realifts seemed at least as interested in demonstrating the
superiority of Hohfeld's "professorial jurists" as they were in advancing a
reformist political agenda.?' Thus, as Schlegel has noted, in 1918 Walter
Wheeler Cook used Hohfeld's system not only to contest Justice Pitney's
reasoning in the anti-union decision Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,
32
but also to pillory the New York Court of Appeals for pretending that it had
decided to uphold a secondary boycott "by the simple process of deductive
reasoning."32 Felix Cohen thought Chief Justice Taft spoke "Transcendental
Nonsense" in the Coronado CoaP27 case when he declared the United Mine
Workers (in Cohen's words) "a quasi-corporation" and therefore suable under
the Sherman Act. Cohen also rejected the union's "metaphysical argument" that
it was not subject to liability because it was not a person.3 Horwitz suggests
(without supporting authority) that Hohfeld's system was a response to the attack
on the labor injunction.329 If it was, then it gave support to the defenders of
the labor injunction and not to its attackers. The trade unionists' strategy for
curtailing the injunction was to distinguish between tangible and intangible
property and to limit injunctive relief to the protection of the former.330 As
a social scientist friendly to labor pointed out,33' a critical-realist approach-the
"really radical reconceptualization of property"332-exploded the very
distinction upon which the trade unionists had premised their argument.
Finally, Horwitz is not always sensitive to the rhetorical context in which
his critical realists advanced the argument for social construction. He insists
that critical realism was a sustained, fully-rounded intellectual position and not
just a method to be employed strategically in attacking orthodox legal thought.
Yet once his favorites put aside their critique and stated an affirmative program
law professor." John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science 41 (1991)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). I am grateful to Professor Schlegel for permission to quote
from his forthcoming book.
323. Wesley N. Hohfeld, A Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law: Have American Universities
Awakened to the Enlarged Opportunities and Responsibilities of the Present Day? 1914 ASS'N Am. L. SCH.
PROC. 76; see Schlegel, supra note 322, at 39-40.
324. Hohfeld, supra note 323, at 110; Schlegel, supra note 322, at 39.
325. 245 U.S. 229 (1917); Walter Wheeler Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life,
27 YALE L.J. 779 (1918).
326. Walter Wheeler Cook, Boycotts of "Non-Union Materials," 27 YALE L.J. 539, 540 (1918); see
Schlegel, supra note 322, at 54-58.
327. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
328. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L REV. 809,
813 (1935); see Peller, supra note 79, at 1228.
329. P. 197.
330. WLLIAM E. FORBATH, THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 154-62 (1991).




of reform they typically resorted to arguments that were scarcely less
functionalist and empiricist than their "naive," scientific counterparts. Felix
Cohen, for example, mixed critical debunking with the "scientific" claim that
law was "a product of social determinants and an index of social conse-
quences. 333 Hale surely believed that economic analysis could not free lawyers
and judges from making normative judgments. Once economic study clarified
a problem, he wrote in 1922, "the final judgment on the issues is an ethical
one.'334 Even when Hale debunked the public-private distinction in a brilliant
analysis of the state action requirement, however, he then advanced a potentially
consequentialist standard ("some matter of high public importance") for making
discrimination actionable under the Reconstruction amendments.335
In short, Horwitz' distinction between critical and scientific realists is
overdrawn. We do not know whether or how his two groups divided on the
political quarrels of the day. We have good reason to think that they joined
politically quiescent or even conservative academics in using Hohfeldian analysis
to keep the practitioners at bay. Finally, whatever theoretical differences separate
Llewellyn's famous call for a "temporary divorce of Is and Ought '36 from
Hale's ultimately ethical policymaking, they scarcely seem substantial enough
to justify pillorying the former as a proponent of "austere positivism" and
lionizing the latter as an anti-positivist hero.
337
I think a more satisfying approach to the history of legal realism begins
by noting a strand of legal realism not captured in Horwitz' dichotomy.
338
Horwitz himself notes that the social scientists who most influenced the legal
realists were institutionalists who adopted neither "the impoverished behavioral
methodological apparatus of logical positivism" nor "the sharp distinction
between facts and values characteristic of ethical positivism. ' 39 Horwitz'
treatment of this fact in Crisis is contradictory. At one point, he insists on
broadening the category of progressive legal thinkers to include such institutional
economists as Ely and Commons. 340 At another, he writes that legal progres-
sives "never really adopted the historicist mode that was so powerful in turning
the social sciences toward relational thinking."' This follows from Horwitz'
assumption that the "collapse of Darwinism" in the 1890's left legal progressives
with no other choice besides moral reform and technocratic social engineering.
333. Cohen, supra note 328, at 843; see Peller, supra note 79, at 1245-48.
334. Robert L. Hale, Economic Theory and the Statesman, in THE TRE D OF EcONOMICS 225 (Rexford
0. Tugwell ed., 1924).
335. Robert L Hale, Rights Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries Inflicted
by Private Individuals, 6 LAW. GUILD REV. 627, 630 (1946).
336. Llewellyn, supra note 298, at 1236.
337. P. 5.
338. On the perils of dichotomy in historical writing, see DAVID H. FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES:
TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT 9-12 (1970).
339. P. 270.
340. P. 182.
341. P. 324 n.36.
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To use Horwitz' terms, they could no longer believe that social processes might
somehow "combine the descriptive and the prescriptive, the Is with the
Ought."
342
In fact, this historicist tenet reached many realists through institutionalist
social science 43 The middle way between anarchic individualism and demo-
cratic statism that some late-Victorian jurists found in the moral sense and others
in custom or evolution, some realists found in twentieth-century notions of
human life as an ongoing, pervasive social process.' Early social scientists,
like Sumner, tended to think of the process as encompassing all segments of
society. Later scholars continued to think of social development as an organic
process, but envisioned it as taking place within groups or institutions, where
it could create diverse ways of knowing right and truth. By the 1920's, the
problem of governing in a plural society was moving to the center of political
thought.
345
Commons' writing on labor law illustrates one form that the confluence
of historicism and pluralism could take. In Legal Foundations of Capitalism
(1924), Commons endorsed Carter's claims that law was the organic product
of social exchanges and that the customs emerging from such exchanges were
"a highly intractable force [that] even the most powerful state cannot
override." 46 He parted company with Carter in insisting that custom developed
in the context of particular groups, so that customs might well differ and conflict.
In labor relations, for example, Commons found not one, but two, equally
legitimate legal systems. One was "the common law of labor," customary work
rules and practices developed in particular industries over time. The other was
the law of contract and property of the employers. The latter was more generally
incorporated into the decisions of common law judges, but it was just as
customary in origin and partial in nature as the law of the workers. 4 7
Such social theories had critical and constructive implications for legal
realists across Horwitz' positivist divide. As a critical matter, realists could now
join Holmes' point about the contested nature of the Lochner Court's social
theory to a pluralist model of the social order. In his historical articles, for
example, the Yale realist Walter Nelles debunked the universals of late-Victorian
342. P. 210.
343. For a succinct overview of the intellectual influences on legal realism, see KALMAN, supra note
294, at 14-20.
344. Fred Matthews, Social Scientists and the Culture Concept, 1930-1950: The Conflict Between
Processual and Structural Approaches, 7 SoC. THEORY 87, 88-90 (1989); see also Ross, supra note 137,
at 242-47.
345. RoDGERs, supra note 14, at 176-203; Mary 0. Furner, Knowing Capitalism: Public Investigation
and the Labor Question in the Long Progressive Era, in THE STATE AND ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE: THE
AMERICAN AND BRrrISH EXPERIENCE 241-46 (Mary 0. Furier & Barry Supple eds., 1990); Gunnell, supra
note 228.
346. JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPrrALISM 299-300 (1924) (quoting John R.
Commons, Law and Economics, 34 YALE LJ. 371, 376 (1925).
347. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPiTALISM, supra note 346, at 304-05.
1070 [Vol. 102: 1019
Critical Tradition
labor law as the rationalizations of a particular social group.48 The constructive
implications of the new institutionalism were less definite. Realists who believed
with Commons that groups and institutions were natural and homogeneous
phenomena, and that their lawmaking imposed few burdens on outsiders, might
conclude that the law should limit itself to ratifying and enforcing the preexisting
arrangements of social groups. Well before the 1950's, then, we should expect
to find precursors of the legal process school. Realists who thought of groups
as constructed and manipulable, who were concerned about the fate of individuals
within groups, and who appreciated the third-party effects of interest-group
bargaining would search for some consensual basis to justify more vigorous
regulation by the state of its constituent groups.
Perhaps Llewellyn's jurisprudence best illustrates the more deferential
approach. Horwitz struggles to comprehend Llewellyn within his dichotomous
framework. While noting the realist's eclecticism, his "typically undogmatic
generosity,"349 and his poetic intellect,350 Horwitz ultimately classifies
Llewellyn as an advocate of "austere positivism." 5' Horwitz does not acknowl-
edge the historicist strain in the realist's thought, which Llewellyn acquired from
a variety of sources including Holmes, Commons, and Pound.
35 2 The most
important conduit, however, was Llewellyn's undergraduate reading of Sumner's
Folkways.353 In this early landmark work of sociology, the self-confident and
politically engaged moralist of Daniel Davenport's college days adopted a
detached, scientific tone, describing "the modem mass man with the same cool
eye with which he would have looked at a Bushman, expecting in truth to find
little difference."" Sumner's readers learned that the mores of the masses
had a determining force on all aspects of society. Elites and outsiders could
influence mass society, but only indirectly and with the certainty that their ideas
would be debased as they grew in currency.
355
Llewellyn's principal mentor at the Yale Law School, Arthur L. Corbin,
was a great enthusiast of Sumner's mores, which he saw as combining "the Is
with the Ought" in just the way Horwitz thinks was impossible after the fall
348. See, e.g., Walter Nelles, A Strike and Its Legal Consequences-An Examination of the Receivership




352. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions Upon Economics, 15 AM. ECON. REV. 665,
665 n.1 (1925). Pound discussed historical jurisprudence in the United States in The Scope and Purpose
of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591, 598-604 (1911).
353. WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 92-93, 414 n.25 (1973);
see also WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF USAGES,
MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES, AND MORALS (Ayer Co. 1992) (1940). On the similarities between Sumner's
and Commons' work, see Jeff E. Biddle, Purpose and Evolution in Commons's Institutionalism, 22 HIST.
POL ECON. 19, 38-45 (1990).
354. STOW PERSONS, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN GENTILITY 244 (1973).
355. See ROSS, supra note 137, 219-24; Ernst, supra note 32, at 36-38.
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of "Darwinism."3 6 Corbin argued that law represented "the custom and the
interest and the average man," and he urged judges to follow "the multitude."
"That judge is just and wise," he wrote, "who draws from the weltering mass
the principle actually immanent therein and declares it as the law. 357 Corbin
frequently referred to Folkways during his classes,3 58 and Sumner's influence
was discernible even in Corbin's technical studies of contract doctrine, as where
he opposed applying the doctrine of privity of contract when its application
would run contrary to "the mores of the time.
359
What Llewellyn found in Sumner was not a mandate for technocratic social
engineering but a chastening lesson about the possibilities of planned social
change. "But for the early and deep-cut influences of Sumner's writings,"
Llewellyn wrote in 1924, "I should by now hold some obnoxious fighting faith
and be stump-speaking a vigorous progress into jail." Attempts to effect social
change seemed useless until one discovered "the laws of change-what can be
changed, and how, and with what result? ' Llewellyn found the same
message in Carter's customary jurisprudence, which demonstrated to Llewellyn's
satisfaction "the huge scope of extra-official controls in law and the limits set
thereby to official action."361 One need not invent a "Realist turn to social
science" to account for Llewellyn's tendency in drafting the Uniform Commercial
Code to endow "economically dominant commercial practices with undeserved
normativity.' '362 The Code's premise that courts should consult "the mores
and usages of honest dealers" (Corbin's words) was much older.3 63 It belonged
to a historicist strand of American jurisprudence that ran back through the 1890's
to the mid-century reception of German historicism by American scholars and
intellectuals.364
In the field of labor relations, in contrast, legal realists were not content
to follow Llewellyn's practice of deferring to group custom. "Scientific" and
"critical" realists alike were concerned about the fate of the individual worker
in well-organized industries. Walter Wheeler Cook, one of Horwitz' scientific
356. P. 210.
357. Arthur L. Corbin, The Law and the Judges, 3 YALE REV. 234, 250 (1914); see also TWININo,
supra note 353, at 30-32.
358. Douglas Arant, Professor Arthur L. Corbin, 74 YALE LJ. 212, 214 (1964).
359. Arthur L Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 27 YALE LJ. 1008 (1918) (italics
omitted), cited p. 50.
360. Karl N. Llewellyn, Non-Conformist Puzzles over Education (1924) (Karl N. Llewellyn Papers,
University of Chicago Law School), quoted in TWINING, supra note 353, at 93. Cf. Pp. 186-87.
361. Karl N. Llewellyn, James Coolidge Carter, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 243,244
(1937). Among the drawbacks of Carter's work Llewellyn identified was his failure to acknowledge the
"multiformity and conflict of subgroup 'customs."' Id.
362. Pp. 212, 211.
363. TWINING, supra note 353, at 303 (citing Arthur L Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales;
Should It Be Enacted? 59 YALE LJ. 821, 835 (1950)). See, e.g., U.C.C. §I-102(2Xb) (1990).
364. See, e.g., Thomas M. Cooley, Labor and Capital before the Law, 337 N. AM. REV. 503, 503-06
(1884); cf. James Whitman, Note, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German
Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE LJ. 156, 157-58 (1987).
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realists, concluded his attack on the Hitchman case by noting that if the labor
movement were freed from the threat of labor injunctions, the "community"
would require legislation to ensure that unions were "open on fair terms to all
alike."365 To do otherwise would be to permit them to exclude reputable
workers for "some unsubstantial reason., 366 When Robert Hale testified in
favor of the National Labor Relations Act, he attacked the notion that a closed
union shop "destroys the freedom of the worker to be independent of a union
if he wishes to be." The claim was true but irrelevant: "in a complicated modem
society like ours," Hale explained, "nobody is going to be entirely free." Yet
even Hale acknowledged that the choice between the coercion of the employer
and the coercion of the union was "a choice between evils," and he conceded
that unions sometimes oppressed their.members.367
The realist figure who perhaps most thoroughly confounds Horwitz'
dichotomy is Thurman Arnold.368 While a law professor at Yale he combined
quantitative studies of the courts with some of the most gleeful debunking of
legal and economic orthodoxies ever produced by a legal realist. Thanks in part
to the influence of his colleague and good friend, the institutional economist
Walton Hale Hamilton, Arnold attacked neoclassical economics for (among other
things) ignoring "the complex character of political institutions.
3 69 In 1938
he left academia to run the antitrust division of the Department of Justice. In
that capacity he prosecuted over one hundred trade unions for labor practices
that disadvantaged "the economy as a whole all out of proportion to any transient
advantage which they may give to any smaller group."'37 Notwithstanding
the presence of economists on his staff, Arnold's prosecutions owed more to
his "progressive moralism '3 71 than to the abstractions of welfare economics.
In particular, "the exploitation of labor by labor" through the high admissions
fees of trade unions and the suppression of internal dissent troubled Arnold.
372
"This sort of thing is not democracy," Arnold declared in the pages of the
Reader's Digest. "It must not be allowed to spread. 373
365. Cook, supra note 325, at 800-01 & n.56.
366. Id. at 801 n.56.
367. I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 81 (1949). I am
grateful to Mark Barenberg of the Columbia University Law School for drawing Hale's testimony to my
attention. Barenberg is at work on an important study of the intellectual and political origins of the Wagner
Act.
368. See Ernst, supra note 32, at 42-53.
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Sa. 26, Mar. 1934, at 28.
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0, Box 641).
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Arnold thoroughly appreciated the critical force of legal realism; he became
a vigorous agent of the New Deal state; he never lost sight of the need to square
the exercise of public power with ethical ideals.374 We cannot tell from Crisis
how many of the other legal realists who left the Yale Law School or the Johns
Hopkins Institute of 'Law for the New Deal escaped with their "political and
moral passion 375 intact. These important figures rarely escape Crisis' foot-
notes, where they suffer a kind of historiographic exile for the crime of
enthusiasm for quantitative methods.376 Arnold's cases suggests that Horwitz
was too quick to dismiss the larger portion of the realists as naive, technocratic
positivists. Horwitz' structuralist linkage of social science and positivism may
serve his present political purposes, but it unduly constrains our view of the
legal realists. Allowing for more contingency and contradiction in their thought
would have preserved the realist legacy of the Yale-educated members of CLS,
many of whom will doubtless be surprised to learn that the "greatest and most
enduring contribution of Realism" owed little to their positivistic teachers.3 7
It would also have permitted all of us to learn more about the other things on
the realists' minds, including the dilemmas of governance in a pluralist society.
Ill. CONCLUSION
"It is much more important to understand than to criticize. 378 Pound's
remark remains good advice long after his quarrel with the legal realists,
particularly for scholars engaged in the common project of studying the history
of American law. In pointing out some of the missteps and missed opportunities
in Horwitz' study of ninety years of American legal thought, I do not wish to
minimize his contribution to our understanding of Victorian lawyers and judges
and their successors. Read with Horwitz' earlier Transformation, Crisis
successfully completes a legal analogue to Hartz' great survey of American
history, one that shares Hartz' dissatisfaction with the liberal tradition, but not
his pessimism about the viability of a radical alternative.
Crisis is the summation of the structuralist tradition in American legal
history, a tradition launched by CLS scholars intent on unmasking the supposed
necessities of everyday life. The book will serve as the capstone of this historical
374. In this Arnold is consistent with recent studies of fiscal and antitrust policy in the New Deal, which
date the rise of a technocratic, managerial approach much later than one would expect from Crisis. Alan
Brinkley, The New Deal and the Idea of the State, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-
1980, at 85 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989); Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and
the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. .J. 1511, 1520-24 (1984).
375. P. 209.
376. Pp. 312-14 n.85.
377. Id. at 270. On the Yale-educated CLS founders, see Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek, The
Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE LiJ. 255 (1961);
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378. Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 709 (1931), quoted
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edifice, rather than the cornerstone for a new structuralist project. In part, this
is because Crisis' contribution to American legal thought is not nearly as novel
and important as Transformation's assault on legal process theory. The avant-
garde among CLS scholars have already left structuralism behind them; to other
legal academics Horwitz' insistence on the social construction of law will come
as old news.
379
More importantly, Crisis appears just as the structuralist understanding of
the uses of history is coming under attack. As intellectual historians attempt
to accommodate the diversity Horwitz overlooks, their studies are growing
increasingly contingent and openended. In theory, at least, Horwitz' methodology
could accommodate many of my objections to Crisis. Horwitz could admit that
there was some diversity in late-Victorian legal thought, and still insist that it
was reducible to a handful of rival structures, perhaps originating in several broad
social categories." He could concede that Holmes' historicism weathered
the social upheavals of the 1890's, and still maintain that the next generation
of legal thinkers required a new belief system to comprehend the unprecedented
social realities of the early twentieth century. He could moderate his criticism
of the scientific realists and recognize that critical realism advanced the law
teachers' project of professionalization, and still argue that most realists worked
from fundamentally different premises than the generations of legal thinkers
who preceded and followed them.
As a practical matter, however, any study that fully addressed my objections
to Crisis would be hard to justify in terms of the critical tradition's notion of
the use of history. In such a study, ideas would not rise and fall with the triumph
or defeat of the structure in which they are embedded. Instead, they would ganer
support by proving their worth to individuals in the diverse facets of everyday
life, where their remote implications are more easily evaded than CLS historians
have suggested. Readers would still learn that their ideas are historically
contingent, but they would not be asked to search out and renounce the structures
that constrain their own thought. Rather, analogies drawn from rounded
portrayals of similarly situated people in the past would broaden their
appreciation of the consequences of their beliefs and actions.
One can disagree with Horwitz on this historiographic level without denying
him a permanent place among scholars of American legal history. Professional
historians will always differ on the relative importance of conflict and consensus,
structure and contingency, change and continuity, text and context, difference
379. Thus Cass Sunstein commences his review of Crisis with the exasperated remark, "Some people
think that it is very important to establish that what we consider 'law' is really 'politics.'" Cass R. Sunstein,
Where Politics Ends, 207 NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 3,1992, at 38. Sunstein's readiness to grant the point validates
William N. Eskridge and Gary Peller's observation that mainstream scholars of American public law
"deradicalize the left's intellectual discourse even as they embrace it." William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary
Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MiCH. L. REV.
707, 764 (1991).
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and similarity; and they will always bring political sensibilities to their work.
Horwitz has gone to the past for insight into one of the abiding concerns of the
CLS movement: how "American jurists since the Revolution have striven to
embody 'a government of laws and not men' in a conception of an autonomous
system of law untainied by politics."3 "1 If Crisis suggests that its subjects have
other insights to offer those who approach them with different concerns and
a more generous spirit, the book nevertheless sets a high standard of intelligence
and intellectual ambition that all legal historians would do well to emulate.
381. P. 9.
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